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1. INTRODUCTION
According to an old Armenian proverb, “the clouds that thunder
do not always bring rain.”1 Exactly the same can be said about OTC
derivatives that “thunder” in the financial world. The only question
is whether they really may cause “rain” in the form of a financial
crisis. This is particularly important in the context of the financial
crisis in 2008. Finding a clear answer to that question would probably make it easier to understand and resolve another problem—how
to regulate OTC derivatives.
Unfortunately, it seems that it is almost impossible to reach any
sort of consensus on this issue. Many financial analysts, policymakers, and regulators have completely different opinions on the causes
of the 2008 financial crisis. This disagreement led to endless debates
regarding the role OTC derivatives played in that crisis and, thus,
the necessary extent of OTC derivatives regulation. Supporters of
the opinion that OTC derivatives caused the crisis, certainly, would
insist on their detailed regulation. Advocates of the opinion that
OTC derivatives market had nothing to do with the crisis of 2008
would obviously be against heavy regulation of these financial instruments, or any regulation at all. There are also those with intermediate positions on this issue, i.e., accepting the necessity of OTC
derivatives regulation, but only to a certain extent. A completely
different view, which also exists among scholars, proposes refusing
to enforce an OTC derivative contract as a speculation instrument,
and enforcing only those contracts where one of the parties is truly
using it for hedging (insurance).2
At the same time, despite the absence of unanimity on the question of OTC derivatives regulation, the Group of Twenty (“G-20”)
Leaders agreed in Pittsburgh in 2009 on certain aspects of OTC derivatives regulation as: (1) attempting to standardize contracts, (2)
developing mandatory central clearing of standard OTC derivatives, (3) requiring reports to trade depositories, and (4) imposing

1 GEVORG R. BAYAN, ARMENIAN PROVERBS AND SAYINGS, TRANSLATED INTO
ENGLISH 11 (1932), available at http://www.armenews.com/IMG/Armenian_
proverbs_1932.pdf [https://perma.cc/S95N-FJBC].
2 Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, 32 REG. 30
(2009) (hereinafter Regulate OTC Derivatives).
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higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared contracts.3
Moreover, the first wave of reforms and enacted legislation in response to the financial crisis has already passed in certain G-20
countries, including the US and the EU.
The primary purpose of this Article is to engage in a comparative
analysis of current OTC derivatives regulation in the US and the EU
with the intent to use the comparison to develop a model regulatory
framework for OTC derivatives. Such analysis is crucially important, as OTC derivatives, like many other financial instruments,
are not limited to certain borders due to the globalized financial
world. Thus, the regulation of OTC derivatives has to be not just
simply domestically, but also internationally, correlated. The choice
of legal framework is determined by jurisdictional territory and the
US and EU include almost two-thirds of the G20 countries—where
the most trade of derivatives takes place. Besides, these areas represent two different legal systems with different development levels
of current OTC derivatives regulation.
Another purpose of this Article is to apply the aforementioned
old Armenian proverb to OTC derivatives and to discuss their role
in the financial crisis of 2008, as well as the question of to what extent
they should be regulated, if at all. The heavy regulation of OTC derivatives seems problematic, as the key difference between OTC derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives is their lower level of
standardization. On the other hand, the unregulated OTC market
has caused many concerns among financial specialists in the past,
especially during the financial crisis of 2008. This Article argues that
(1) unregulated OTC derivatives bear certain risks that exceed the
benefits of their use and (2) while many of these risks materialized
during the crisis of 2008, the OTC market did not actually cause the
crisis; therefore, (3) regulation is still necessary—but only to a certain extent.
Part 2 contains an overview of derivatives and discusses their
role in the financial crisis of 2008. Part 3 explains the current regulatory regimes in the US and the EU for OTC derivatives by using a
comparative analysis of the two regimes to identify the advantages
3 G20 LEADERS’ STATEMENT, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009), available at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/
pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3ME792F] (articulating aspects of OTC derivatives regulation that garnered consensus
among the G20 leaders).
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and disadvantages of the two approaches, while developing a
model regulatory framework for the regulation of OTC derivatives.
The Conclusion summarizes the outcome of the analysis and model
development, and discusses its implications for future regulation of
OTC derivatives.
2. OTC DERIVATIVES ESSENTIALS AND REGULATION RATIONALE
2.1. Overview of Derivatives
Before we can understand the role that OTC derivatives played
in the financial crisis of 2008 and the appropriate regulatory framework necessary for efficient OTC derivatives markets (which would
be necessary to discuss the cutting-edge issues of the global OTC
derivatives regulation), it is worth understanding the basics of OTC
derivatives: their substance, the various types, and market size. Unsophisticated forms of derivatives existed at least 4,000 years ago in
the ancient markets.4 Current derivatives have very little in common with their ancient forms,5 which is unsurprising, as every
“product” of the human mind has developed on a "simple-to-complex" basis.
There are many complex definitions of derivatives given by legal
scholars and finance specialists, but, essentially, derivatives are financial instruments whose value is derived from another underlying asset (such as a security or commodity).6 Although such a definition might be fairly criticized as being “more descriptive than
prescriptive” and “inadequate to sustain legal reasoning”7, we consider it appropriate and sufficient for the purposes of this Article.
Derivatives were initially intended for neutralizing or “hedging”
risks. Nowadays, however, they are very often used for speculating.
4 Edward J. Swan, Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of Derivatives 27 (2000).
5 Id. at 28.
6 ROBERT
E. LITAN, INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY AT
BROOKINGS, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A
GUIDE
FOR
POLICY
MAKERS,
CITIZENS
AND
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 3, 12 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Research/Files/Papers/2010/4/07%20derivatives%20litan/0407_
derivatives_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6XG-LMQX] (defining “derivatives”).
7 RAFFAELE SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION: A TRAPPED INNOVATION
AND A BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATORY REFORM 9–10 (2011).
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This is why some scholars also compare contracting derivatives to
betting.8
To illustrate the aforementioned ways of using derivatives let us
give an example of a very simple derivative contract—a put option.
Assume that an investor has a portion of the common stock of Apple, Inc. in his portfolio. Despite the company’s good performance,
the investor is still concerned that the volatility of the market might
adversely affect stock prices. To protect his investment and to hedge
that risk, he can buy the right to sell his Apple stocks at or before a
specified date (“maturity date”) and at a predetermined price
(“strike price”), i.e., buy a put option for his Apple stocks. In this
way the put option can mitigate the investor’s risk that the stock
price falls below the strike price. The put option could also be used
in a speculative way by investors who are willing to bet on stock
prices falling or growing.
There are four main types of derivatives:
(a) Forward contracts - agreements to buy something at a
specified price on a specified future date;
(b) Futures contracts - generic types of forward contracts executed at an exchange;
(c) Swap contracts - agreements to exchange future cash
flows, where the amounts to be exchanged are based on a
future variable; and
(d) Option contracts - agreements granting the holder the
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell something at a
specified price on or before a specified future date.9
Another common division is between derivatives traded over
organized exchanges (“exchange-traded derivatives”) and the OTC
market (“OTC derivatives”). Exchange-traded derivatives are listed
and concluded on an authorized and regulated derivatives exchange such as the Chicago Board of Trade, the Boston Options Exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange, or Philadelphia Stock
8 Lynn. A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (hereinafter Credit Crisis) (attributing the 2008 downfall of “several systematically important financial institutions” to “bad derivatives bets”).
9 Alireza M. Gharagozlou, Unregulable: Why Derivatives May Never Be Regulated, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269, 273 (2010) (listing types of derivatives).
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Exchange. These derivatives are standardized, i.e., they have standard size, contractual terms, and rules of trading set by the exchange.
All of this makes a derivatives exchange a liquid marketplace.
Moreover, the exchange-traded derivatives are negotiated through
clearinghouses, a central counterparty system, which means that the
parties to a derivative do not deal directly with each other. Each
market participant has to clear its trades through the clearinghouse
at the end of each trading session and deposit a margin sufficient to
cover its debit balance with the clearing house. Finally, the exchange-traded derivatives market is highly transparent, as derivatives pricing is public. The Bank for International Settlements (the
“BIS”) estimated that there were over 231.1 million outstanding contracts on organized exchanges with a notional principal amount of
29 trillion US dollars10 as of June 2014, of which 82.3 million were
entered into in North America and 82.6 million in Europe.11
However, the aforementioned advantages of the exchangetraded derivatives do make them limited in many ways. First, the
exchange-traded derivatives are not flexible financial instruments as
they are fully standardized and may not be modified. Thus, such
instruments may not always be able to satisfy the parties’ business
interests. Moreover, the heavy regulation, including such preventive mechanisms as margin and clearing requirements, significantly
increases the costs of the exchange-traded derivatives market participants. Hence, many traders would prefer dealing on the much
less regulated, less costly, and therefore, more convenient, OTC
market.
OTC derivatives were traditionally negotiated privately and directly allowed counterparties to tailor a contract to their individual
specific needs. As OTC transactions were not processed through
regulated exchanges, they were not subject to the same standardization, clearing, and margin requirements as exchange-traded derivatives were. This was probably the reason why the OTC market was
10 Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Exchange Traded Derivatives Statistics, Table
23A: Derivative financial instruments traded on organised exchanges, BIS
QUARTERLY REV. 146 (Sep. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_
qa1409_hanx23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4CC-GCBS].
11 Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Exchange Traded Derivatives Statistics, BIS
QUARTERLY REV. 147, Table 23B: Number of contracts (contracts outstanding and
turnover) (Sep. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_qa1409_
hanx23b.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FSF-93QD].
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more attractive for investors and why the notional amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives were greater than the exchange market.
However, the absence of regulation is no longer the case in most developed jurisdictions including the US, the EU and, to some extent,
Russia, where OTC derivatives reforms started shortly after the financial crisis in 2008. At the same time, while the reforms are not
finished yet and not all requirements have become effective, the notional amount of outstanding global OTC derivatives as of June 2014
was estimated to be almost 700 trillion US dollars.12
Essentially, the question arises: why and to what extent do OTC
derivatives need to be regulated? What benefits do they have and
what risks do they expose to the market participants? What role did
they play in the crisis of 2008?
2.2. OTC Derivatives Benefits and Costs
The use of OTC derivatives, like the use of almost any other financial instrument, has certain benefits and costs. It is necessary to
not only identify these benefits and costs, but also to analyze them
and ascertain which are more substantial. In other words, we try to
determine whether advantages prevail over potential costs and
whether actions can be taken to mitigate significant risks, e.g., via
regulation.
2.2.1. Benefits
Prior to discussing the costs of OTC derivatives and the risks
they may generate, it would be fair to mention the benefits of these
instruments that make them so popular among investors and endusers.
2.2.1.1. Traditional Use of OTC Derivatives
OTC derivatives are mainly used for the following three purposes: hedging, speculating, and arbitrage.

12 BANK FOR INT'L
STATISTICS AT END-JUNE

SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES
2014 1 (Nov. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/otc_hy1411.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6R-MWYP] (identifying that the notional value of outstanding contracts, which is used as an indicator of overall activity, at the end of June was $691 trillion).
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2.2.1.1.1. Hedging
First of all, as mentioned earlier, since OTC derivatives are not
standardized instruments, they are more flexible in terms and,
therefore, may be customized for the specific needs of each party.
This is important as, in practice, situations that may arise and require hedging are essentially unpredictable and certainly not standardized. For instance, a producer of wheat wants to increase its production in response to increased demand.
The necessary
infrastructure is expensive, but the investment is justified by rising
demand. Financing will only be available, however, if the producer
is able to lock in the price at which it can expect to sell its product in
the future. The dealer provides that price risk protection through a
customized OTC derivative.13
OTC derivatives may also be used by multinational corporations
to reduce exposure to fluctuating exchange rates by locking in an
exchange rate via currency derivatives.
Despite the obvious advantages of using OTC derivatives as a
hedging instrument, there is an interesting debate among scholars
whether such hedging by a corporation creates any value for the
shareholders.14 The opponents of hedging would claim that many
wise shareholders have already hedged their risk exposures by diversifying their portfolios. However, the counterargument would
be that using derivatives for hedging purposes creates shareholder
value by reducing the volatility of the company’s earnings, which
positively affects the price of the company’s shares, i.e., shareholder
equity.
Finally, a more global advantage of hedging lies behind the assumption that both parties of the derivatives transaction are hedgers, and their opposite risks would off-set each other and therefore,
maintain economic stability.15
13 INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, OTC DERIVATIVES:
BENEFITS TO US COMPANIES, 4 (2009), available at https://www.sifma.org/
uploadedfiles/issues/regulatory_reform/otc_derivatives/isdacongressslides528v2may2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/38FT-DAVG].
14 The following arguments in this paragraph are based on Scalcione, supra
note 8, at 48–49 (“[W]hile hedging existing risk should remain unconstrained, a risk
taking derivatives operation should be carried out in a regulated environment for
the protection of the market at large.”).
15 Kevin Meyer, Analysing the New OTC Derivatives Regulations: A Critical
Overview of Tomorrow’s Legal Framework 4 (August 26, 2011) (unpublished
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2.2.1.1.2. Speculation
Whereas certain companies use OTC derivatives to hedge their
risks, many corporations and individuals speculate on them in order
to try to achieve huge returns. Despite the fact that speculation exposes companies to significant risks (to be discussed in the next section), it can also have some positive impact on the market conditions. First, speculation supports the level of liquidity on the market
that is necessary for its normal operation. Moreover, Friedman’s
“rational speculation” hypothesis contends that if a market price
moves away from its “fundamental” value, which is an indicator of
the market's competitive and rational operation, then speculators
will bring that “fundamental” value back.16
2.2.1.1.3. Arbitrage
Arbitrage is the strategy of discovering and taking advantage of
market anomalies and inefficiencies. For instance, if a certain company’s stock trades at a lower price on one stock exchange than on
the other, an arbitrageur would purchase the stock on the former
exchange and sell it on the latter, i.e., would pocket the difference.
On one hand, OTC derivatives have a lower level of liquidity
than exchange derivatives as a result of their status as non-standardized contracts. They therefore intuitively would seem less attractive
for arbitrageurs. However, OTC derivatives could still serve as an
arbitrage tool due to both their high level of customization, i.e., flexibility, and their low level of transparency (the marginal differences
in such contracts could be much larger). In other words, arbitrageurs using OTC derivatives could gain more money using less leverage than they could using the exchange traded contracts.

L.L.M. thesis, Edinburgh University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2121222 [https://perma.cc/GLE8-YNMK].
16 Dick Bryan & Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political
Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital & Class 125-26 (2006).
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2.2.1.2. Other Ways of Using OTC Derivatives
2.2.1.2.1. Information Disclosure to Markets
Derivatives can serve as an instrument for sending certain signals to the market regarding a company’s performance. For example, in the case of Intel,17 the management sent an explicit message
to shareholders about their expectations on the company’s future
share price through derivatives. Rather than just distributing dividends, which would immediately affect the share price, Intel’s management decided to distribute “put warrants” to shareholders at a
strike price sufficiently high enough to indicate their confidence that
the company’s future share price would be much higher.
2.2.1.2.2. Tax Benefits
As discussed above, derivatives can be used as hedging instruments and can reduce the volatility of the company’s earnings. Reduction of the earnings’ fluctuations also leads to the reduction of
tax liabilities which consequently adds value to the company.18
2.2.1.2.3. Hedge Accounting
Companies using OTC derivatives are able to benefit from hedge
accounting rules, which require a close fit between a hedge and the
underlying risk.19 The rule of “marking to market” causes volatility
in profit and loss and therefore affects how others view the company. When a company uses hedge accounting, entries for the ownership of a security and the opposing hedge are treated as one.20
Therefore, hedge accounting reduces the volatility in profit and loss
(as well as in the balance sheet) that is created by the repeated
“marking to market” adjustment of a financial instrument’s value.

17 The following case description in this paragraph is based on Scalcione, supra
note 8, at 52-53.
18 Scalcione, supra note 8, at 56.
19 J OHN H ULL , O PTIONS , F UTURES , AND O THER D ERIVATIVES 38 (7th ed. 2008).
20 Hedge Accounting, INVESTOPEDIA DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/h/hedge-accounting.asp [https://perma.cc/P97U-K2AL].
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2.2.1.2.4. Credit Derivatives
There are a number of benefits specific to credit derivatives.
Credit derivatives may avoid undesirable credit exposures and redistribute them among banks and institutional investors who find
them attractive as a tool for diversifying their portfolios.21 In addition, credit derivatives may serve as a mechanism to customize the
risk-return profile of a financial product.22 Credit default swaps
(“CDSs”), by limiting banks’ risk, increase their credit capacity and
willingness to lend. Therefore, CDSs greatly facilitate companies’
access to capital from bank loans.23 Sometimes OTC derivatives can
even be an indicator of the inadequacy of specific market prices.24
For instance, CDS spreads signal the market's attitude towards a certain credit risk.25
Thus, OTC derivatives play an important role in various industries and geographic areas. They are used to manage certain risks
and capital raising activities and are thought to increase economic
growth. However, these benefits are not without costs.
2.2.2. Costs
Along with the numerous aforementioned benefits, OTC derivatives expose market participants to certain risks. Therefore, this
next Section provides an overview of the costs of the use of OTC
derivatives including the OTC market specifics as well as certain
types of generated risks.

21 J.P. Morgan & Co. & RiskMetrics Group, The J.P. Morgan Guide to Credit Derivatives, § 3 (1999), available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/
Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DRV-BL5H].
22 Id.
23 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2007) (“Because swaps limit the bank’s downside
risk (and pass it on to other parties, such as insurance companies and pension
funds), banks are willing to lend much more to many more businesses.”).
24 Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2010).
25 Michael Casey, U.S. Is Riskier Than Euro Zone; So Says CDS Market, W ALL S T .
J.
(Mar.
24,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703312504575142112712294450 [https://perma.cc/VHP5-C6PJ].
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2.2.2.1. OTC Market Specifics
The most important feature of the global OTC market usually
considered from the point of hedging risks is its potential for generating new market risks. This potential is determined by its specific
characteristics, which can be divided into several groups.26
2.2.2.1.1. Combination of Classic and Exotic Contracts
The first group of such characteristics relates to the large variety
of OTC derivative contracts, which is much greater than the variety
of exchange contracts. One example of such a large or even infinite
variety of OTC derivatives is the high variety of option contracts.
As noted above, in a standard exchange option the price, transaction
date, and underlying asset itself are fixed. By contrast, in an OTC
option contract, all of these characteristics can be changed in various
ways. As such, contracts in which these characteristics have been
changed are called "exotic" contracts. An exotic option contract may
include: (1) the use of another derivative as an underlying asset
(e.g., swaptions, or options on swaps); (2) a choice of option type
(put or call) by the buyer at a specific time; and (3) a set price level
at which the option is canceled or, on the contrary, is executed.27
As a result, OTC derivatives may be based on contracts that are
not covered by any country’s current legislation, and therefore a
party to such a contract will have no right to remedies in cases where
this contract is breached.28 This is more salient for contracts governed by the legislation of civil law countries, where contract law is
codified and all types of contracts are specified in statutes.
2.2.2.1.2. High Level of “Derivative Leverage”
Both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives have a special kind
of leverage that differs from financial leverage. In essence, derivative leverage means that the derivative transaction is not related to
the payment of the entire value of the underlying asset. Therefore,
26 Alexandra V. Galanova, Influence of the Global OTC Derivatives Market on
the Market Risks 47 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Russian Economic
Academy). Alexandra Galanova defines ten such groups, whereas I address only
those that are specific to OTC derivatives market and that I consider the most plausible and relevant for the purposes of this Article.
27 Id. at 48–50.
28 Id. at 48–49.
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a positive difference in the prices (rates) is matched not with the entire value of the asset, but only with the amounts advanced in the
market of its derivative. In other words, the return from transactions involving assets in the derivatives market is charged against a
smaller amount of capital than in the physical market, where the entire value of the asset is paid. Thus, the rate of return on the derivatives market is always higher than in the physical market.29 Professor Frank Partnoy, a former derivatives trader, also notes that OTC
derivatives are frequently used to create excessive amounts of unwarranted leverage.30
One unique feature of the OTC derivative is that the level of derivative leverage is even higher than on the exchange market because the OTC market does not employ the use of a central counterparty, and there are therefore no margin requirements. For instance,
in order to conclude a swap contract, there could be no requirement
for depositing any amounts in advance. Payments received by one
party under the swap contract are usually charged only against its
pay-offs, which are usually also broken in time. Derivative leverage
obviously increases the number of open positions in the market with
the same amount of equity. However, in the event of adverse
changes in market prices (rates), or of the improper use of derivative
(or financial) leverage, such leverage can cause significant growth in
losses, i.e., accelerated growth of risk.31 Finally, the synergy of derivative leverage and minimal, if any, capital requirements can increase market volatility and the level of systemic risk.32
Certainly, the level of derivative leverage may vary depending
on the specific type of derivative. Therefore, corporate risk policies
should be customized to the specific derivatives and levels of leverage that a certain company uses.33

Id. at 52–53.
Frank Partnoy, Op-Ed., Danger in Wall Street's Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/opinion/
15partnoy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B8RL-RCJC].
31 Galanova, supra note 26, at 53–54.
32 Baker, supra note 24, at 1307.
33 Scalcione, supra note 7, at 71.
29
30
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2.2.2.1.3. Non-Transparency
One of the very prominent features of the OTC derivatives market is its relative opacity compared to the highly transparent exchange market. This opacity results from the strictly bilateral nature
of transactions on, and the absence of central counterparty systems
in, the OTC derivatives market. The need for a high degree of transparency arises from the large number of the OTC market participants, as well as from the high volume of trade.
This opacity can create market uncertainty, particularly in times
of unstable market conditions. Parties using OTC derivatives to
hedge certain risks cannot simply understand the true reliability of
their hedges if their counterparty's exposures are not clear. Therefore, a market participant who is unaware of its counterparty’s credibility could hedge one risk, but assume a disproportionate amount
of counterparty risk.34
The OTC market’s lack of transparency also makes it difficult for
regulators to obtain adequate information to oversee these markets,
as regulators do not know the exact size of any particular segment
of the OTC derivatives market. Moreover, as the OTC derivatives
market is global, regulators usually do not know the precise breakdown of the counterparties’ positions within the companies they
regulate, which may force them to seek such information outside of
their jurisdiction.35 Finally, the OTC market’s opacity prevents regulators from identifying risks at early stages and eliminating or mitigating them.36
2.2.2.1.4. Decentralized Market Infrastructure
The OTC derivatives market has much greater decentralization
and less self-regulation than the exchange market, which is regulated not only by states but also by exchanges themselves. The OTC
derivatives market is highly decentralized as its participants negotiate independently, while exchange-traded derivative transactions
take place only on an exchange. Unlike exchange markets, the OTC
Baker, supra note 24, at 1306.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENT TO
THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
ON OTC DERIVATIVES, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND TRADE REPOSITORIES 14–15
(2010) [hereinafter Impact Assesment].
36 Baker, supra note 24, at 1306.
34
35

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

958

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

market is informal in terms of both regulatory issues and trading
management and oversight.37
However, it would be unfair to characterize the OTC market as
absolutely decentralized because regulators in different countries
and self-regulatory organizations still find ways to influence it. For
example, there are various organizations including the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) that are designed to
improve the operation of the OTC market. Such associations work
out recommendations aimed to standardize financial records, assist
in the effective management of risk, assess regulatory and operational risks, and initiate voluntary disclosure of OTC derivative
transactions.38
On the one hand, market decentralization is one of the most attractive attributes of OTC transactions to market participants. On
the other hand, since the OTC derivative transactions are negotiated
without a centralized clearing system, margin requirements, and restrictions (limits) on the value of open positions, the market participants have to manage credit risk on their own. Hence, risk management in the OTC market is also decentralized.39
Organizational imperfection of the global OTC market infrastructure inevitably leads to a relative increase of risks on it due to
the:
• Lack of professional organizations that specialize in servicing settlements under OTC derivative contracts, which
would reduce the associated risks of the market;
• Lack of uniform rules for settlements and performance
guarantees on OTC derivatives (these rules and guarantees
may vary from transaction to transaction and from one market maker to another);
• Inconsistencies, differences, and gaps in the national legislation of different countries regarding the obligations that
must be fulfilled under these instruments.40

37
38
39
40

Galanova, supra note 26, at 57–59.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 85.
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2.2.2.2. OTC Market Generated Risks
The aforementioned features of the OTC market infrastructure
can reduce the effectiveness of market discipline and create instability in the market, having a negative impact on the dynamics of market prices. These features therefore directly contribute to the following market risks.
2.2.2.2.1. Counterparty (Credit) Risk
Counterparty risk denotes the possibility that the counterparty
may default on its obligations under a derivative contract. For exchange-traded instruments, there is a central clearinghouse that
guarantees to all market participants that their transactions will be
accomplished, regardless of counterparty default.41 Moreover, valuation on the exchange market takes place almost every day, which
is much more frequent than on the OTC market.42 Counterparty risk
is difficult to manage due to the following flaws of the OTC market:
(1) the lack of information on the counterparty in the transaction; (2)
the absence of a uniform risk management and control system; (3)
unreliability of the existing risk measuring and modeling methods.43
The lack of information about the counterparty results from: (1)
the need to preserve the counterparty’s trade secrets; (2) constant
changes in the counterparty’s economic activity, rapidly rendering
past information about the counterparty obsolete; (3) changes in the
methods of market risks calculation, which often requires new information.44 Infrequent valuation of exposures combined with a
high degree of leverage may lead to large margin calls in case of
41 Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the
Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1047 (1994).
42 However, reconciliation frequency had a positive tendency in the last few
years according to ISDA Margin Surveys. In 2014, larger portfolios showed an increased rate of portfolio reconciliation versus 2013. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2014 24 (2014) available at http://www2.isda.org/
functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/ [http://perma.cc/R5QWGD7W]. Moreover, in 2010 dealers performed daily reconciliation on 56% of their
trades, while in 2014 larger firms reconciled 84% of all portfolios on a daily basis.
Id.; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2010 12 (2010) available
at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/
[http://perma.cc/R5QW-GD7W].
43 Galanova, supra note 26, at 86.
44 Id.
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sudden price changes, which may result in high costs for the party
receiving the margin call or may even lead to its default.45
The main drawback of the OTC market related to risk management is that every market participant needs to have its own risk
management system since OTC derivatives participants deal directly with each other without the benefit of an exchange clearinghouse. The operation and maintenance of such a system, where each
participant manages its own risk, is quite expensive. In addition,
the overall effectiveness and “defensive” capabilities of such a system are always limited. On the exchange market, this burden is carried by the clearinghouse, which is much less expensive for market
participants.46 Moreover, the differences in the risk models used
may lead to collateral disputes between counterparties.47
Issues of the reliability of the risk measuring and modeling
methods are common for both the exchange and OTC derivatives as
they rely on the development of the relevant areas of economic science. However, the OTC market has its specific reliability issues, as
risk management is concentrated within the separate companies,
which often have insufficient resources for the task. Therefore, their
methods can significantly lag behind those applied by larger financial institutions.48 Moreover, in order to evaluate counterparty risk,
a market participant must determine the cost of replacing the contract in the event of counterparty’s default, which requires modeling
the volatility of both the underlying and related fluctuations.49 Such
measuring of volatility is usually very subjective, as it “depends on
judgment and personal opinion about what the future will look
like.”50
Finally, the long-term nature of OTC derivatives contracts also
increases the risk of default by the counterparty. The OTC market
45 Impact Assessment, supra note 25, § 3.1.4.3 (remarking on the problems
caused by under-collateralization of contracts, which increases parties’ leverage, as
well as the infrequent valuation of that collateral and the resulting exposures).
46 Galanova, supra note 26, at 87.
47 Impact Assessment, supra note 25, § 3.1.4.3 (noting that different models can
lead to different valuations of derivative contracts and thus lead to conflicts as to
the amount of collateral that secures that contract).
48 Id.
49 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1048.
50 Kenneth S. Leong, Estimates, Guesstimates and Rules of Thumb, in FROM BLACKSCHOLES TO BLACK-HOLES: NEW FRONTIERS IN OPTIONS 63, 67 (1992).
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participants often have to rely on each other's financial credibility
for many years.51
2.2.2.2.2. Liquidity Risk
While exchange-traded derivatives have a very high degree of
liquidity, OTC derivatives are less liquid. This is partly due to the
non-standardized nature of OTC contracts, which are often individualized and tailored to specific market participants. Therefore, it is
very difficult for parties to liquidate such a contract before it expires.
In addition, the OTC market has no centralized infrastructure that
would provide liquidity.
The non-standard character of OTC derivative contracts makes
them non-fungible. Market participants that wish to close a position
have to go back to the original counterparty (and usually make a
deal). This gives the dealer a certain amount of market power—and
hence, pricing power. Market participants could alternatively enter
into an opposite position with a different counterparty in order to
eliminate the liquidity risk; however, it would not eliminate counterparty risk.52
Another reason for low liquidity is the long-term duration of
OTC contracts, which are usually concluded in five or more years.
Such long-term obligations cannot easily be altered in the event of
dramatic changes in the market. The rigidity caused by the lack of
premature liquidation options increases the credit risk of such contracts. By contrast, short-term obligations specific to exchange derivatives allow for these derivatives to have high liquidity, as they
correspond to changing market conditions.
2.2.2.2.3. Price Risk
The pricing of privately negotiated OTC derivatives is less transparent than that of exchange-traded standardized instruments. The
prices of OTC derivatives are usually determined by impenetrable
formulas. One or both parties of an OTC derivative transaction may
not fully understand the terms of the contract they have negotiated.
Waldman, supra note 41, at 1048.
COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., ENSURING EFFICIENT, SAFE AND SOUND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 3.1.3 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/report_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5QWGD7W].
52
52
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Such complexity of an OTC transaction creates incentives for price
manipulation.53 A remarkable example of such manipulation is the
case between Procter & Gamble Co. and Bankers Trust and Co., in
which the latter kept its counterparty in the dark about key aspects
of the derivatives sold. This was revealed by a taped conversation
of its employees discussing a leveraged derivative deal the bank had
sold to Procter & Gamble Co.54
Another concern regarding the price of OTC derivatives is that
it could be affected by external factors not foreseen by the contracting parties. Without a clearinghouse to determine the price, counterparties are usually left to argue the effect that such external factors should have on them.55
2.2.2.2.4. Operational Risk
An OTC derivatives transaction goes through several processing
stages before it is confirmed and completed. During the term of an
OTC derivative contract, several single (e.g., termination) or recurring (e.g., settlement of payments) events may take place that need
to be managed. In order to efficiently manage these events, a very
high level of automation is needed, the availability of which, in general, directly correlates with the level of contract standardization,
i.e., the higher the level of standardization, the more automated processes are available.56
As mentioned earlier, unlike standardized exchange derivatives,
OTC derivatives are customizable, with room for a high degree of
flexibility in the terms and conditions of contracts. Therefore, they
require substantial involvement of human resources in certain
stages of contract performance. Such intervention becomes particularly problematic when the transaction volumes increase enormously. As a result, low levels of standardization and automation
lead to the increase of operational risk, i.e., the risk of loss due to
53 Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises,
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 681 (2002) (advocating that if OTC transactions are
complex, fraud and abuse are likely).
54 Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 16, 1995,
http://www.businessweek.com/1995/42/b34461.htm [http://perma.cc/6KXLTTYE].
55 Eppel, supra note 54, at 682 (remarking that parties are left to dispute
amongst each other the effects of these factors).
56 Impact Assessment, supra note 35, § 3.1.5.1.
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incompetent or failed internal and/or external processes. This may
also lead to the increase of other risks, e.g., legal risk or even counterparty (credit) risk. For instance, the failure to confirm a transaction because of lack of automation may pose a threat to its enforceability or the capability to net it against other transactions.57
2.2.2.2.5. Systemic Risk
One of the main concerns about OTC derivatives among specialists is the fact that they are a source of systemic risk. There are many
various approaches to understanding and defining such risk. Alan
Greenspan fairly observed that although “[i]t is generally agreed
that systemic risk represents a propensity for some sort of financial
system disruption, . . . one observer might use the term ‘market failure’ to describe what another would deem to have been a market
outcome that was natural and healthy, even if harsh.”58 As a result,
the “very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat unsettled.”59
However, the general underlying idea is that systemic risk is the risk
that a given system that is adversely affected by an economic shock
(systemic event) such as market or institutional failure may trigger
the failure or significant losses of other markets or institutions,
which is caused or exacerbated by distrust or loss of confidence in
the stability of the system.60 The systemic event may lead to various
significant consequences,61 and OTC derivatives have several elements and features that may increase the systemic risk.

Id. § 3.1.5.3.
George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16
CATO J. 17, 21 n.5 (1996) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at a Research Conference on Risk Measurement and
Systemic Risk 7 (Nov. 16, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ journal/cj16n-2.html [http://perma.cc/A6VU-D6ZW]).
59 Id.
60 See Scalcione, supra note 7, at 93; Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO.
L.J. 193, 203 (2008) (describing an example of a company’s systemic risk that was
caused by its exposure to other actors in the market).
61 The consequences of a systemic event are discussed further in this article in
relation to the financial crisis in 2008.
57
58
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Most OTC derivatives transactions are not secured.62 This creates the risk that the failure of one significant market participant to
make payments could result in its counterparty's delay of payments
and cause a quick transfer of defaults to other market participants63
or even to other markets, including non-financial ones due to their
interconnectedness. Such a chain reaction is known as the “domino
effect.”64 Systemic risk is increased even more by the fact that the
OTC derivatives business is concentrated among a small number of
market players using similar derivatives strategies.65 Thus, the failure of one of these players would likely have adverse systemic effects. The systemic risk is further aggravated by the long-term nature of the OTC transactions.66
There is another concern regarding the use of certain trading
strategies such as dynamic hedging, which involves adjusting a
hedge as the underlying asset value changes (often several times a
day). As such strategies are based on “an unrealistic assumption of
liquidity,”67 they can fail in the case of poor market conditions, causing the parties to default and further triggering overall market meltdown.
The “Too Big to Fail” concept could be an additional factor incentivizing market participants to increase risk taking, as the likelihood of government interference is almost guaranteed if the default
of a particular company seems to be large and significant. Unfortunately, the taxpayers have to bear the burden of bailing out such
huge financial entities in order to prevent a financial meltdown.
Finally, it is important to note that today financial markets are
no longer domestic, and transactions all over the world are highly
interconnected. The OTC market is certainly not an exception to this
62 William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, BUS. WEEK,
June 1, 1992, at 102, 103 (noting that most OTC derivatives transactions are “unsecured and exposed to ever-more-volatile interest-rate, currency, and futures markets”).
63 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1055.
64 Scalcione, supra note 8, at 87.
65 Id. at 98–99.
66 See Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Dec. 1991, at 113, 119 (describing OTC transactions as private contracts that rely on
bank counterparties, which is not problematic for short terms but can create concern when stretched to longer terms).
67 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1056.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3

2016]

FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES

965

globalization. This requires regulation and oversight not just at the
level of a particular country, but globally. Therefore, the systemic
risk associated with OTC derivatives is also aggravated by the lack
of cooperation among regulators of different countries.
2.2.3. Benefits vs. Costs
The risks, or potential costs, posed by OTC derivatives seem far
greater than the benefits such instruments give. Therefore, the use
of OTC derivatives may be appropriate only if they are comprehensively regulated. However, prior to defining how exactly they have
to be regulated, we may want to see the risks created by the use of
OTC derivatives in practice.
2.3. The Role of OTC Derivatives in the Financial Crisis
In previous sections, we discussed various threats that OTC derivatives may pose, but only in theory, not in practice. One may
fairly argue that, in theory, all financial instruments bear some level
of risk, even government securities (very unlikely, but still possible).
It seems that specialists took this same view of OTC derivatives, arguing that the world had changed and the risks exposed by derivatives would never materialize. Otherwise, it is hard to explain the
level of carelessness with regard to OTC derivatives prior to 2008.
However, this view was decisively discredited by the financial crisis
of 2008, when many companies involved in large amounts of OTC
transactions suffered huge losses or simply went bankrupt.
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the US and then spread
all over the world has become a serious challenge for the modern
global economic system and caused significant structural changes to
it. The negative role of derivatives, as will be shown further, is often
cited as the main reason of the crisis by both economists and finance
specialists. Besides, several years before the crisis of 2008, Warren
Buffett expressed his concerns about derivatives, calling them financial weapons of mass destruction with latent, but potentially lethal,
dangers.68
In our opinion, the crisis was caused by a whole range of factors,
both financial (such as the large and unregulated OTC market) and
68 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2002), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V4SX-LNR9].
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economic (such as the fall in real estate prices). The synergy of these
factors led to the deterioration of the developed economies. However, for the purposes of this Article—to understand how exactly
unregulated OTC derivatives can adversely affect the economy, we
mainly address only their role in the crisis of 2008.
2.3.1. Regulation prior to 2008
Before discussing the specific OTC derivatives cases of 2008 and
trying to show their consequences, it seems appropriate to present
the general regulatory picture right before the financial meltdown.
This section will first illustrate the development of OTC market regulation in the world’s major economies. This analysis will allow for
a better understanding of the reasons why those cases related to derivatives actually happened during the financial crisis, what could
have been done to prevent them, and, therefore, what regulation
seems to be appropriate.
2.3.1.1. United States
In the US, OTC derivatives were not highly regulated before the
financial crisis of 2008.69 For many years, the US legal system made
a distinction in terms of the enforceability of agreements intended
to hedge a certain risk (i.e., when at least one of the parties was trying to reduce risk) and speculative contracts: the former were enforceable in the courts while the latter were not.70 However, derivatives speculators resolved the problem of enforcement by trading
in private venues that enforced their contracts—the commodity exchanges.71
The first attempt to regulate derivatives was made in 1922, with
the enactment of the Grain Futures Act, which was reenacted as the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) in 1936.72 The CEA had two key

69 Frank D'Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 476–77 (2010).
70 Stout, supra note 10, at 11 (describing this conceptual difference and noting
that the test often employed was whether either party actually owned or planned
to own at some point the asset that was the subject of the contract).
71 Id. at 14–15.
72 Pub. L. No. 49-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
1-27f).
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provisions: (1) it authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to oversee and regulate private commodity exchanges and (2) it required that all futures contracts be traded on a
regulated exchange.73 Thus, the CEA ensured that speculative derivatives on the prices of commodities be traded on organized and
regulated exchanges.
However, speculators found other ways to profit, such as by betting on interest and currency rates, housing prices, or inflation.74 By
the 1980's, an alternative type of futures contracts was developed,
usually referred to as “swaps.”75 Initially, the CFTC defined swaps
as “an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash
flows measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or prices
with payment calculated by reference to a principal base (notional
amount).”76 Essentially, the question arose whether such contracts
would be subject to the mandatory exchange trading under the CEA.
The CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA exchange-trading requirement by issuing a 1989 Policy Statement declaring that swaps
must be “negotiated by the parties as to their material terms, based
upon individualized credit determinations, and documented by the
parties in an agreement or series of agreements that is not fully
standardized.”77 As the CEA did not empower the CFTC to grant
exemptions from the CEA's exchange-trading requirement, in order
to avoid ambiguity, Congress gave the CFTC such authority in
1992.78 Soon after, in 1993, the CFTC used its new power and exempted from the CEA's exchange-trading requirement those transactions that were, inter alia, “not part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their material economic terms”
73 § 4a–4b, 49 Stat. at 1492–94. There was an exception for hedge-to-arrive contracts that contemplated actual delivery and were thus “cash forward contracts”
outside the scope of the CEA.
74 See Stout, supra note 10, at 19 (listing various market characteristics that
could be bet on and chronicling the rise of swaps related to interest rates).
75 Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with
Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank's Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused
by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127,
131–32 (2011) (hereinafter Overwhelming).
76 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694–95 (July
21, 1989).
77 Id. at 30, 969.
78 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat.
3590, 3629–32.
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and “not entered into and traded on or through a multilateral transaction execution facility.”79
What followed over the next five years were several cases of
companies suffering significant losses speculating through OTC derivatives: Proctor & Gamble Co. (157 million US dollars) in 1994,80
Orange County Fund (2.5 billion US dollars) in 1995,81 and Long
Term Capital Management (survived only with a 4 billion dollar
government bailout) in 1998.82 As a result, in May 1998, the CFTC
issued a concept release stating that “it [was] appropriate to reexamine its regulatory approach to the OTC derivatives market taking
into account developments since 1993”83 and proposing certain restrictions. However, the other financial agencies (the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury)—members of the President’s Working Group—were opposed to the CFTC’s proposals, and that led to
Congress enacting legislation to limit the CFTC's authority to regulate OTC derivatives.84
The last and most important regulatory action regarding OTC
derivatives before the 2008 crisis was the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”).85 The CFMA exempted OTC derivatives from all exchange trading requirements
under the CEA, subject to the following conditions: that both parties
to the transaction are “eligible contract participants” and that the

17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b), (d) (2009).
See Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close
Out Two Interest-Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3 (examining Procter &
Gamble’s losses from OTC derivatives).
81 See Laura Jereski, Orange County Fund Losses Put at $2.5 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 1994, at A3 (measuring the losses to the Orange County Fund at $2.5 billion).
82 See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 261 (2003) (describing how LTCM only survived from its
derivative bets due to a government bailout).
83 Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115–16 (May 12,
1998).
84 See THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 12–15 (1999), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf
[perma.cc/5DQE-DB38] (explaining the need to limit the CFTC’s ability to regulate
OTC derivatives).
85 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong.
(2000).
79
80
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execution (or trading) of the transaction itself occurs outside a trading facility. 86
2.3.1.2. European Union
Derivative market regulation in the EU was historically much
lighter than in the US. For instance, there were no position limits on
market participants, neither in national regulation nor in the rules
applied by exchanges.87 Moreover, before the financial crisis of 2008,
no supranational European regulation existed since OTC derivatives were not regulated separately from other derivatives in most
countries. Rather, a system of self-regulation was implemented in
different national laws that governed OTC derivative markets by a
very limited group of actors, such as ISDA, Group of 30,88 and the
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group.89
However, certain European countries used to have legislation on
OTC derivatives that has gone through several regulatory changes.
For instance, the United Kingdom was the world’s leading jurisdiction involved in OTC derivatives trading in 2007 (right before the
crisis). 90 Like the CFMA in the US, the U.K. Financial Services and
Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA)91 largely exempted most derivatives

86 Id. § 103. In general, for any business entity or individual to be an “eligible
contract participant” had to have total assets exceeding 10,000,000 US dollars with
some exceptions requiring lesser amounts in the case of using the OTC derivative
as an instrument for risk management. Id. § 101.
87 See, e.g., PETER GIBBON, COMMODITY DERIVATIVES: FINANCIALIZATION AND
REGULATORY REFORM 17–18 (2013), available at http://www.diis.dk/files/media/
publications/import/extra/commodity_derivatives_web_wp_2013.pdf
[perma.cc/L8NM-66SF] (examining the relatively meager set of regulations regarding position limits in the EU).
88 A private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior representatives of the private and public sectors and academia.
89 See JOHANNES PETRY, REGULATORY CAPTURE, CIVIL SOCIETY & GLOBAL FINANCE
IN DERIVATIVE REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMODITY DERIVATIVE REGULATION IN
EUROPE 11–12 (2014), available at http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/16140.pdf [perma.cc/7EZC-XRZN] (examining the regulations in countries throughout Europe on the subject of derivatives and the parties involved).
90 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, SURVEY, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND
DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2007 19–12 (2007), available at https://www.bis.
org/publ/rpfxf07t.pdf [perma.cc/2ZSH-EKXM] (comparing different countries’
banking activities in 2007).
91 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (U.K.).
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transactions from regulatory oversight.92 Nonetheless, some regulation remained, and instead of prohibiting certain OTC derivative
transactions, the United Kingdom imposed restrictions on which
parties were allowed to transact in OTC derivatives.93 Moreover,
the parties were required to comply with certain requirements, including maintaining capital and risk controls and disclosing all OTC
derivatives trading to regulators.94 Capital maintenance requirements were the most common and likely the only restrictions in the
leading European countries as of 1999 according to the CFTC’s survey.95
Thus, both the US and Europe lacked a comprehensive regulatory framework prior to the 2008 financial crisis. The lack of such a
framework resulted in the formation of a large OTC derivatives market with almost no oversight and high systemic risk.96 This market
was very sensitive to the dramatic changes in the global economy
that would take place during the crisis.
2.3.2. Impact of OTC Derivatives on the Crisis of 2008
Various factors caused the financial crisis, but unregulated derivatives played a unique role. There is still no consensus among
finance specialists and legal and economic scholars on the impact of
OTC derivatives on the global economy in 2008.
The most extensive debates took place in the US, where the crisis
initially started. For instance, Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC,
noted, “[T]he over-the-counter derivatives marketplace was in fact
part and parcel” of the financial crisis in 2008.97 Mr. Gensler had
92 See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 639, 661 (2010) (studying how
the United Kingdom ceded its duty to regulate Credit Default Swaps and the effects
of that decision).
93 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, REGULATION OF OVER-THECOUNTER DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS 7–8 (1999) (describing the existing regulations
of OTC derivatives in countries around the world in 1999).
94 Id. at xi.
95 Id. at vii–xvii.
95 Id. at vii–xvii.
96 See Chander, supra note 93, at 649–50 (demonstrating the risks in the market
and its effects following the financial crisis).
97 Gregory Meyer, CFTC Head Blames OTC Derivatives for Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
6,
2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3be62c7a-fae8-11de-94d800144feab49a.html#axzz3DnqDbp9H [http://perma.cc/X4H6-DRDY].
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many times claimed, prior to the reforms, that OTC derivatives were
not regulated enough and could pose risks to the financial system.98
Michael Greenberger, professor at University of Maryland School of
Law, goes even further, stating that “the darkness of this huge multitrillion dollar unregulated [OTC derivatives] market not only
caused, but substantially aggravated, the financial crisis.”99
On the contrary, many other specialists deny a cause-and-effect
relationship between OTC derivatives and the financial crisis. For
example, Steven W. Kohlhagen, former professor of International Finance at UC Berkeley, testified that OTC derivatives had “absolutely
no role whatsoever in causing the financial crisis.”100 It is also necessary to mention Lynn A. Stout, one of the most radical persons
regarding OTC derivatives regulation, who does not accept the perception of the crisis as an economic phenomenon, instead focusing
on the legal decisions that led to the crisis.101 In Stout’s opinion, the
crisis was caused by the removal of legal constraints on speculative
trading in OTC derivatives by the CFMA in 2000.102
Despite the absence of unanimity regarding the role of OTC derivatives in the crisis of 2008, almost all specialists always
acknowledge the following factors did have a major role in the crisis:
(1) the adverse role of credit default swaps (CDS) and (2) the systemic risk derived from all OTC derivatives. These are the main factors suggesting the impact of OTC derivatives on the economy in
2008 and showing how the risks connected with them can materialize.

Id.
The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 21 (2010) (testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor,
University of Maryland School of Law), available at http://cybercemetery.
unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175404/http://c0182412.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf [perma.cc/M9CU-SHLR] [hereinafter
Testimony].
100 The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 1 (2010) (testimony of Steven W. Kohlhagen, Former Professor of International Finance, University of California, Berkeley) available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175228/http://c0182412.cdn1.cloudfi
les.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0630-Kohlhagen.pdf [perma.cc/VHW6-R8CU].
101 Stout, supra note 10, at 4.
102 Id.
98
99
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2.3.2.1. Credit Default Swaps
In June 2008, the notional value of the unregulated OTC market
was estimated to be over 680 trillion US dollars with almost 60 trillion of CDSs.103 Many specialists agree that the unregulated multitrillion dollar CDS market adversely affected the global economy
during the 2008 crisis. The SEC Chairman at that time, Christopher
Cox, dubbed the CDS market a “regulatory black hole” that needed
“immediate legislative action.”104 Even those who supported deregulation of derivatives by the CFMA—former SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt and former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan included—have admitted to the responsibility of the CDS market deregulation for the 2008 economic crisis.105
What is a CDS and how does it work? A CDS is a contract under
which one party (protection buyer) will pay an annual fee to another
party (protection seller) either until the maturation of the contract or
until a credit event (loan default or other event)106 occurs on an underlying party that bears the credit risk of the contract (reference entity).107 If such a credit event occurs, the buyer will deliver bonds or
loans of that reference entity for the notional value of the contract to
the seller and will receive compensation (usually the face value of
loan or of other obligation) in return (as shown on GRAPH 1).108 In
other words, CDSs serve as a mechanism for insuring the financial

103 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC
FIRST HALF OF 2008 6–7 (2008), available

DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE
at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_
hy0811.pdf [perma.cc/RD8K-PP3A] (showing the incredible size of the OTC derivatives market at the height of its market share).
104 Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH.
POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431.html
[perma.cc/GG7NEQW3].
105 See Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/
economy/09greenspan.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/U3PT-64S8] (demonstrating the lasting effects of the boom years under Greenspan as Federal Reserve Chairman that ultimately led to the Financial Crisis in 2008).
106 Events considered as default could be, inter alia: (1) non-repayment of a loan
at maturity, (2) breach of contract, and (3) declaration of bankruptcy.
107 See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 53, § 3.1.1–3.1.3 (describing
the structure of CDS and the relative risks involved).
108 Id.
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viability of certain obligations by paying a “premium” for such insurance.109
GRAPH 1. CDS STRUCTURE

However, by using the term “swaps,” CDS fell into the regulatory “black hole”—no agency had direct oversight authority over
them after they were deregulated by the CFMA’s.110 The same can
be fairly inferred in relation to the situation in Europe and Russia,
where swaps regulation was almost absolutely absent during that
time. Thus, there were no regulatory requirements in place before
the crisis that could have prevented the catastrophe.
To more precisely delineate the CDS’s role in the 2008 crisis, it is
worth describing in brief the housing securities market situation
first. The securitization of mortgage loans results in mortgage
backed securities (“MBSs”) that derive their value and payments
from a pool of underlying mortgages. An MBS pools payments from
individual underlying mortgages and distributes the pool of cash
and payments to investors, packaged as collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), in tranches ranked by seniority and risk level. CDSs
109
110

Testimony, supra note 100, at 14.
Id.
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were widely used for “insurance” of CDOs but several misunderstandings by the market participants led to the market crash. First,
the issuers of CDSs believed that housing prices would always go
up, and therefore issuance of a CDS was considered “risk free.” Due
to this assumption, they tried to issue as many CDSs as possible.
Second, after the housing market collapsed, and the default events
provided for in the CDS occurred, it turned out that the undertaken
risk was significantly undervalued. Third, as each CDO was considered to be protected by CDS insurance, the demand for MBSs that
sourced CDOs was constantly growing. Fourth, the lack of CDS
market transparency meant that regulators could not discover that
CDSs were not secure enough. Finally, under the wrong assumption of CDS being absolutely risk-free and due to the high demand
for them, the issuers began to write “naked” CDS to buyers who did
not hold the loan instrument and who had no direct insurable interest in the loan, i.e., who had no risk for MBSs or CDOs. Essentially,
this allowed traders to speculate on the creditworthiness of reference entities and such CDSs were also used to create synthetic long
and short positions in the reference entity.111
A very illustrative example of the CDS use is the case of American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”). Before the financial crisis,
AIG underwrote huge amounts of CDSs on CDOs. However,
whereas many banks and other issuers of CDSs usually hedged their
short positions in CDS with long positions in other CDSs, AIG was
never on both sides of the CDS transactions.112 Meanwhile, the size
of its exposure to CDSs was approaching 440 billion US dollars before the crisis, which exceeded what it could pay in the event that
CDOs defaulted.113 After the housing market crash and subprime
mortgage borrowers defaulted, the value of CDOs became remark-

111 See Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Before
the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 11–35 (2008) (statement of Erik Sirri, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts101508ers.htm
[perma.cc/3GCT-PPPP] (explaining the rampant speculation and modification that
had become commonplace in the market).
112 See Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sep. 18, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apartidUSMAR85972720080918 [perma.cc/X6QB-KA68] (describing how AIG’s onesided bet without any hedging made it particularly vulnerable to the crash).
113 Id.
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ably low. At that point, AIG had already insured more than 441 billion US dollars of fixed-income investments held by the world's
leading institutions, including 57.8 billion US dollars in paper related to subprime mortgages.114 Counterparties who had bought
CDS protection from AIG also demanded insurance payouts. All
this, along with increased collateral requirements due to the lowering of its credit ratings by major agencies, made AIG face liquidity
issues. It did not have enough cash and other liquid assets to fulfill
its pending obligations. As we all know, the story ended with the
180 billion US dollar government bailout of AIG. AIG’s downfall is
a typical case of the counterparty, liquidity, and price risks posed by
OTC derivatives in practice.
Thus, the AIG story explicitly shows how the risks posed by
complex instruments can materialize due to the lack of proper regulatory requirements, i.e., (1) exchange trading that could make CDS
trading and pricing more transparent and adequate; (2) clearing in
order to secure parties’ capital maintenance; or at least (3) reporting
that could send regulators “red flags” before the market collapses.
2.3.2.2. Interconnectedness: Systemic Risk Derived from All
OTC Derivatives
Only a truly systemic risk can pose a threat to the entire financial
system.115 As discussed earlier, OTC derivatives can be the source
of such systemic risk. Unregulated OTC derivatives contributed to
the formation of an environment of opaque and uncontrolled relations between: (1) financial institutions, (2) financial markets, and (3)
financial and non-financial markets.116
The most explicit evidence of the ability of OTC derivatives to
create systemic risk could be observed at the level of the financial
114 See George White & Peter Moreira, Fed Lends AIG $85 Billion, Takes Control,
AM. LAW. (Sep. 17, 2008), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202424584749/
Fed-Lends-AIG-85-Billion-Takes-Control#ixzz3MIMqAFHQ
[perma.cc/F5KYYY5H] (detailing how AIG had insured incredibly large amounts of subprime mortgages).
115 See The Role of Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives in the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n. 6 (2010) (testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member, Masters Capital Management, LLC), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0630-Masters.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9SZ-VHWS] (explaining that nothing short of cataclysmic system-wide risk can bring down the entire system).
116 Id.
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institutions, where there was “an interlocking web of very large exposures amongst the 20 or so largest swaps dealers.”117 The situation was exacerbated by the market participants’ belief in the invincibility of the system, which consisted of dealers that were
considered “Too Big to Fail.” Market participants recognized that
the collapse of a system whose participants were not only significant, but also so firmly linked, could lead to the collapse of the whole
economy. Therefore, they all had confidence that the US Treasury
would come to the rescue (a hugely expensive example of moral
hazard). However, some of these “immortal” companies, like Bear
Sterns, did actually fail or, in the case of Lehman Brothers, went
bankrupt. These two companies are of special interest as they had
one common aspect: both were functioning as intermediaries for
OTC derivatives, in particular, “swaps” trading.
First was Bear Sterns, which recognized significant losses in its
trading portfolios after the subprime mortgage collapse.118 As these
portfolios served as collateral for the borrowed funds, the company’s lenders started to require more liquid collateral. Consequently, Bear Sterns had to sell more of its mortgage securities,
which lead to a decrease in their market value. Meanwhile, the majority of Bear Sterns’ counterparties, including those in derivatives
transactions, terminated their operations and therefore significantly
cut the company’s earnings. All this made Bear Sterns suffer serious
liquidity problems. Nevertheless, in its essence, as SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox noted, Bear's collapse “was the result of a lack of
confidence” and not a result of “inadequate capital.”119
A very similar story happened to Lehman Brothers, which was
a counterparty to 930,000 derivatives transactions at the time it filed
for bankruptcy.120 Initially, Lehman suffered an unprecedented loss
due to the subprime mortgage meltdown. In 2007, it underwrote
Id. at 7.
Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L. REV. 183, 197 (2009).
119 Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. to Nout
Wellink, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision 1 (Mar. 20, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48_letter.pdf [perma.cc/B9QWSPWJ].
120 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. First Creditors Section 341 Meeting, January 29, 2009, 19–20. See also, GuyLaine Charles, OTC Derivative Contracts in Bankruptcy: The Lehman Experience, 13 N.Y. ST. B.A. N.Y. BUS. L. J. §1:7–16 (Spring 2009)
(examining the effects of derivatives once a company goes into bankruptcy).
117
118

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3

2016]

FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES

977

more mortgage-backed securities than any other company did and
its leverage ratio at that time was 31:1.121 After that, the same chain
of events as in the cases of AIG and Bear Stearns was observed: loss
of counterparties’ confidence, fall of stock prices and credit ratings
resulting in demands for larger collateral and eventually leading to
the liquidity default. Lehman was just unlucky that it was the last
to fall into crisis because after having bailed out Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, the government refused to rescue Lehman.
When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, swaps dealers, as well
as their customers, immediately reevaluated the creditworthiness of
their counterparties.122 Moreover, as they were no longer sure of
counterparties’ viability, they started to reduce counterparty exposure as much as possible, regardless of relevance to subprime MBSs
or even of swap types. This reduction adversely affecting not only
CDSs, but also the whole OTC market. Furthermore, since swaps
were used for hedging various portfolios and swap dealers were
used to secure their exposures by using futures, the OTC market
participants’ panicked reaction transferred to regulated exchange
markets, including futures, stocks and bonds. The crash in the futures market, in turn, spread to the commodities market as their producers and users hedged their risks through futures contracts.
Thus, the crisis demonstrated how, due to the interconnectedness within different financial and even non-financial markets, the
start of a single element’s collapse could create a chain reaction
throughout the system, previously referred to as the “domino effect.”
2.3.2.3. Did OTC Derivatives Cause the Crisis?
While the adverse role of OTC derivatives during the financial
crisis is today taken as conventional wisdom, the question of
whether they actually caused the crisis still remains unresolved.
Nonetheless, it is important to understand their role in the crisis in
order to assess the adequacy of current and future regulation of OTC
derivatives.
121 Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Jan. 29,
2008),
available
at
http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.t5Bb.htm#9mfu
[https://perma.cc/3XPY-XJVZ].
122 Masters, supra note 116.
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OTC derivatives obviously caused the formation of “virtual”
capital, collateralized by significantly overvalued assets. After derivatives double the original debt, they then can serve as both collateral and payment instruments. On the one hand, the expansion of
market transactions leads to the growth of profits. On the other, the
volume of transactions masks the primary debt, dissolving it in the
mass-traded securities. However, obligations do not disappear, and
their failure creates the “domino effect” through the OTC derivatives. In addition, hedging transactions with securities via OTC derivatives increases the volume of speculative obligations on the market, while the illusion of the constant primary debt’s warranty
increases. Thus, the derivatives, especially synthetic ones, played
the role of the “virtual” capital growth multiplier at the housing and
financial markets, which, in turn, led to larger losses.123
Moreover, the substitution of lending by various derivatives,
collateralized by debt, allowed banks to generate new assets with
almost no undertaking of new liabilities (deposits). The widespread
use of derivatives has changed the structure of the financial market:
from a two-tiered model of a market economy consisting of cash and
loan commitments, it adds a third level—derivatives. That is why
many specialists considered derivatives to be one of the main causes
of the financial crisis.124
It seems more plausible, however, that derivatives have become
the tool that has transferred “overheating” from the mortgage market to investment and insurance institutions.125 At the beginning of
the crisis, the amount of subprime mortgages was extremely high,
due partly to government policy designed to stimulate housing demand. Eventually, the high percentage of bad loans leads to a significant imbalance in the economy. Thus, within the structure of
mortgage derivatives even a minor impairment in the value of loans

123 Evgeniy V. Petrenko, Derivatives Market in the World Financial System:
Condition, Development, and Prospects 67 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Russian State Trade and Economics University) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).
124 Id. at 70–71.
125 Alexey F. Sedunov, Derivatives Market in the World Economy: Features of
Development and Transformation Direction 92 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Russian Science Academy, Institute of Economics) (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). See also, Id. fig.3.
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could carry huge losses. This process then affected the shares of investment banks that underwrote CDSs. More specifically, the difficulties experienced by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG during the crisis originated outside the OTC market, even though their
exposures in the OTC derivatives market, and in particular CDS
contracts, transferred those difficulties to other sectors of the economy.
GRAPH 2: RISK TRANSFER CHAIN

In addition, some finance specialists opine that “the financial crisis would have been more severe” without the operation of the OTC
derivatives market,126 which “continued to function effectively
throughout the crisis, and ha[s] not been adversely affected by Lehman’s collapse.”127 Others, to the contrary, claim that OTC credit
derivatives in general, and CDSs, in particular, delayed the crisis by
allowing the housing bubble to grow and that without CDSs, there
would have still been a financial crisis, but it would have come earlier and “would have been less severe.”128
Nevertheless, one thing is clear: the origin of the crisis lay not in
the derivatives market, but in the economic imbalance created by
126 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE REGULATION
MARKETS: IS THE EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?, 2009-10, H.L. 93, at 118.
127 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE REGULATION
MARKETS: IS THE EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?, 2009-10, H.L. 93, at 20.
128 Kohlhagen, supra note 101.
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the “defective” mortgages, as well as in the opacity of the evaluation
and credit ratings of MBSs, which eventually led to significant excess amount of CDSs issued over hedged loans.
In other words, applying the old Armenian proverb, the OTC
definitely “thundered” in the financial world, but did not actually
bring the “rain,” even though they made it “heavier.”
2.4. Preliminary Findings


The use of OTC derivatives, like the use of almost any
other financial instrument, has certain benefits and
costs.



Costs of OTC derivatives are greater than the benefits
such instruments yield. Therefore, the use of OTC
derivatives may be justified only if they are comprehensively regulated.



Among the various risks posed by the OTC market,
the core ones are the counterparty, liquidity, and systemic risks created mainly by the absence of central
clearing and reporting requirements, and by the resulting lack of transparency.



These risks did actually materialize during the financial crisis of 2008. However, OTC derivatives did not
directly cause the financial crisis, which originated
outside the OTC market.



It was possible for the risks associated with OTC derivatives to materialize because the US as well as Europe lacked a comprehensive regulatory framework
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, in particular: (1) exchange trading; (2) clearing; or at least (3) reporting.

OTC derivatives need to be regulated, but how exactly and to
what extent? The next Part will investigate this question, by comparatively analyzing current OTC market regulation in the US and
EU.
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3. THE US AND EU REGULATION AND A MODEL FRAMEWORK
EXPERIMENT
In Part 2 of this Article, it was noted that the US as well as Europe
lacked a comprehensive regulatory framework for OTC derivatives
prior to the 2008 financial crisis. The rapid growth of the derivative
markets as well as the role of derivatives in the financial crisis of
2008 have pressured governments to take immediate actions. As a
result, after the financial crisis spread globally, the G20 memberstates held numerous summits to find possible solutions to the crisis
and to strengthen international cooperation in financial oversight, in
particular in the question of OTC derivatives regulation.129 During
these summits, the G20 countries, including the EU and the US,
came up with general regulatory goals for their future national legislation on OTC derivatives. More precisely, the G20 Leaders agreed
during the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 that:
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded
on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements.130
In June 2010, G20 Leaders in Toronto reaffirmed their commitment and committed to accelerate the implementation of strong
measures to “improve transparency and regulatory oversight of
over-the-counter derivatives in an internationally consistent and
nondiscriminatory way.”131 Thus, the objective of the G20 agreement was to establish a global regulatory framework for OTC derivatives to avoid the possibility of a market collapse in derivatives
such as occurred in 2008.
3.1. Current Regulation Overview
Both the US and the EU have taken some significant steps to implement the agreements arising out of the aforementioned G20
129 The G20 Summits have been held in Washington (2008), in London and
Pittsburgh (2009), and in Toronto and Seoul (2010).
130 G20 Leader's Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 2009), supra note 3.
131 G20 Leader's Declaration, The Toronto Summit (June 2010), available at
https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Toronto_Declaration_eng_0.pdf.
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meetings. The legislation is intended to authorize various oversight
agencies to regulate derivatives and to reduce the risk of market
abuse in derivative markets.
3.1.1 United States
In July 2010, in response to the financial crisis, Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd Frank Act).132 The Dodd Frank Act consists of sixteen sections regulating almost all financial industries. In particular, Title
VII of the Dodd Frank Act, the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, focuses on derivatives regulation.133
Thus, Title VII of the Dodd Frank Act is the primary statute regulating derivatives in the US at the current time. It created a comprehensive regulatory framework for the swaps market in order to
eliminate the gap in past regulation of the market. The objective of
the legislation was to bring safety and transparency to the OTC market for derivatives based on the assumption that such increased
transparency can reduce the risks associated with derivatives such
as counterparty risk. The statute requires the use of clearinghouses
or central counterparties (CCPs) for trade settlements, exchange
trading of standardized OTC derivatives, and trade reporting of all
OTC derivatives to a central data repository. The legislation integrated a regulatory framework for the regulation of the OTC derivatives market and market participants that involves the cooperation
of multiple national agencies.134
3.1.2. European Union
The EU, in response to the role OTC derivatives played during
the financial crisis, enacted the European Markets Infrastructure

Pub. L. No 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–74.
134 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1062 (2012) (analyzing the situations whereby people have the appetite for the appropriate level of financial reforms).
132
133
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Regulation (EMIR),135 the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II),136 and the complementary Markets in Financial
Instruments Regulation (MIFIR).137
The EMIR establishes the general regulatory framework for derivatives in the EU. The EMIR introduces a reporting requirement
for OTC derivatives, a clearing requirement for covered OTC derivatives, and mechanisms to reduce counterparty and operational
risks for bilateral OTC derivatives. The regulation also empowers
national agencies to monitor and regulate the OTC derivatives market in conjunction with the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA). The EMIR established the business conduct standards
and capital requirements for CCPs and other market participants.
The MIFID II and MIFIR138 contain additional requirements on
derivatives market structure, exemptions from regulation, and requirements for derivative trading venues.
3.2. Comparison between the US and the EU Regimes
The regulations passed in the US and the EU concerning OTC
derivatives have substantial similarities. Nonetheless, differences
exist in the American and European approaches to regulating OTC
derivatives. These differences developed due to various reasons:
historical background of securities and commodities regulation, policy considerations, regulatory powers, among others.
3.2.1. Regulatory Authorities
Before comparing the core of OTC derivatives regulation in the
US and the EU, we first discuss the regulatory agencies authorized
135 Regulation 648/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
4 July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories,
2012 O.J. (L 201/1) [hereinafter EMIR].
136 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173/349) [hereinafter MiFID
II].
137 Regulation 600/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Regulation 648/2012/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173/84) [hereinafter MiFIR]
138 MIFID II and MIFIR will come into effect on January 3, 2017, and repeal
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 on markets in financial instruments (MIFID).
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to oversee the derivatives market. The further development of regulation and maintenance of stability in the market almost completely depend on such agencies, rather than legislators, being able
to react immediately to issues that arise. Moreover, both the US and
the EU approaches caused serious debates among scholars as well
as practitioners.
3.2.1.1. United States
The Dodd Frank Act divides regulatory authority for the derivatives market between the CFTC and the SEC. Under the provisions
of the CFMA, the CFTC and the SEC could regulate the futures markets but were not allowed to regulate the swaps market. Nonetheless, the CFMA gave the SEC authority to investigate cases of fraud
on the swaps market,139 including credit default swaps. Because the
SEC could not impose transparency requirements such as record
keeping or disclosure rules, it was difficult for the agency to exercise
its anti-fraud authority.
The Dodd Frank Act solved the issue of lack of sufficient power
to regulate and monitor the OTC market by giving the CFTC and
the SEC joint responsibility over swaps.140 The authority of the
CFTC includes swaps, swap dealers and major swap participants,
swap data repositories, and derivative clearing organizations
(DCOs).141 The SEC has similar rulemaking powers but with respect
to security-based swaps.142
Both the CFTC and the SEC have to coordinate and consult with
each other in formulating and implementing new rules in order to
maintain consistency in regulations across their respective jurisdictions.143 In addition, when making rules, the SEC and the CFTC
must consult with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.144 The
Dodd Frank Act also gave the CFTC and the SEC joint rulemaking
authority to develop regulations establishing the requirements for
the records that must be kept for swap data in repositories.145
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

7 U.S.C. § 2.
Dodd Frank Act § 712 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302).
Id. § 712(a)(1).
Id. § 712(a)(2).
Id. § 712(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 712(d)(1).
Id. § 712(d)(2)(B).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3

2016]

FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES

985

3.2.1.2. European Union
The EMIR grants regulatory authority to the ESMA in developing draft regulatory technical standards along with safeguarding the
stability of the financial markets in an emergency situation.146 The
ESMA also has a central role in the authorization and monitoring of
CCPs and trade repositories.147 In addition, the EMIR authorizes the
members of the European Central Banks (ESCB) to exercise oversight of the clearing and payment systems for derivatives.148 The
ECSB is also responsible for approving interoperability arrangements among the CCPs, authorization and monitoring of CCPs (in
addition to the ESMA), and for recognizing CCPs in countries outside of the EU.149 The grant of authority to the ECSB system does
not affect the existing responsibility of the European Central Bank
(ECB) or the national central banks to ensure stable clearing and
payment systems within the EU and within each member nation of
the EU.150 The ESMA and the ESCB are required to cooperate closely
when preparing the relevant draft technical standards.151
3.2.1.3. US vs. EU
The rulemaking powers granted to the regulatory authorities is
one of the key differences between the US and the EU approaches.152
The grant of regulatory authority under the Dodd Frank Act has the
advantage of clearly defining and separating the responsibilities of
the CFTC and SEC in the area of oversight of the OTC swaps market.
At the same time, the advantage of the EU regulatory regime is that
while it divides defined regulatory responsibilities between multiple agencies, there is still one central regulator—the ESMA. The US
and the EU approaches fall within the three basic organizational

EMIR, supra note 136, art. 1(10).
Id.
148 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 1(11).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See Daria S. Latysheva, Note, Taming the Hydra of Derivatives Regulation: Examining New Regulatory Approaches to OTC Derivatives in the United States and Europe,
20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465, 490 (2012) (examining the differences between
the US and EU models).
146
147
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models that, according to professors Coffee and Sale,153 exist with
regard to financial regulation in the major capital markets: the functional/institutional model (current US approach), the consolidated
financial services regulator model (current EU approach), and the
'twin peaks' model.
The US approach seems less optimal as it leaves a large room for
different sets of rules governing similar instruments, which could
create confusion or even fragmentation.154 Moreover, issues regarding the fragmented regulatory scheme between these two agencies
existed in the past with regulation of futures by the CFTC and regulation of securities by the SEC, and some commentators suggested
“merging the CFTC and SEC and creating one regulatory body with
jurisdiction over both.”155 Professor Jill E. Fisch also expressed her
concern about having similar functions under the regulatory oversight of different agencies as it may produce jurisdictional conflicts
or simply lead to regulatory gaps.156
Another aspect where the Dodd Frank Act and EMIR differ relates to establishing and implementing rules by the regulatory authorities. The Dodd Frank Act grants the regulators much broader
authority to issue the necessary rules. According to the EMIR, agencies mainly just enforce, rather than issue, regulations—with the exception of regulatory technical standards in various aspects of regulation, which ESMA should only draft, and the European
Commission then adopts. The EMIR itself contains detailed provisions that directly regulate the functioning of CCPs and trade repositories. In contrast, the Dodd Frank Act authorizes the CFTC and
the SEC to jointly adopt rules governing trade repositories.157 The
US regulatory regime has always relied on the agencies' active role
in establishing rules and standards. The logic that lies behind it is
that agency rulemaking ensures greater regulatory stability and
clarity for regulated entities opposed to the case law. Such reliance
153 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 717 (2009) (analyzing the US and EU
approaches based on three different frameworks).
154 Scalcione, supra note 7, at 354.
155 D'Souza et al., supra note 70, at 511–512.
156 See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV.
785, 786–87 (2009) (noting the potential issues the American system for regulating
derivatives).
157 Dodd Frank Act §712(d).
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on agency rulemaking is not the case in the EU, where, besides central regulators, each EU Member State also has its own regulatory
authorities. Already at the stage of drafting the current derivatives
regulation, the European Commission explicitly stated that “the objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can . . . be better achieved by the EU.”158 Thus, the EU
regulation leaves some, but much less space for adopting rules by
the regulators, which seems to be better tailored to ensure a comprehensive regulatory framework.
Another advantage of the EU regulatory approach is the greater
responsibility of the banking system and the ECSB in regulating the
operations of CCPs in comparison with the US approach. The ECSB
directly monitors the CCPs and functions as a regulatory agency
with a banking agency that has more experience in supervising such
process as clearing in the CCP. In the US, the advisory position of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors reduces its ability to regulate the operations of CCPs. While the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors in the US provides CCPs with liquidity and access to discount windows,159 the central bank does not have the same oversight
authority over CCP operations as in the EU. As a result, the SEC
and the CFTC have complete responsibility for monitoring clearing
processes and capital adequacy—ensuring that the CCPs properly
manage their capital reserves.
The differences in the grant of regulatory authority in the US and
the EU are likely to be the result of the regulatory structure development in both jurisdictions. The federal government in the US has
exclusive jurisdiction over financial regulation that involves interstate transactions with various federal agencies having authority to
oversee financial markets. The Dodd Frank Act amended existing
legislation to incorporate swaps by granting additional authority to
agencies. In addition, some rivalry is likely to exist among agencies
that led to splitting jurisdiction between the SEC and the CFTC. In
contrast, the EU has concurrent jurisdiction in financial matters with
Member States due to its structure, where the Member States have
retained power to control matters such as regulation of markets
158 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM (proposed 2010), at 6.
159 Dodd Frank Act § 806 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465).
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within their borders. In addition, the regulatory agencies of the EU
are not as well established as in the US and do not have an extensive
history of oversight in specific areas. The EMIR functionally established new authority to regulate rather than to amend a broad array
of existing statutes authorizing regulation of financial markets.
3.2.2. Covered Instruments
The scope of the instruments covered is one of the core aspects
regarding derivatives regulation. The way derivatives are defined
gives the basis for construing and applying all remaining rules and
regulations. Hence, it is very critical to understand to which instruments the relevant rules apply as this may create further obligations
for the parties, e.g., clearing or reporting, or both.
3.2.2.1. United States
The provisions of the Dodd Frank Act apply to all transactions
in the OTC market that involve the purchase or sale of derivatives
with exceptions for some types of transactions. Title VII of the Dodd
Frank Act applies to “swaps” and “security-based swaps” as they
are defined in the CEA and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34
Act) i.e.:
“Swaps”160 include, inter alia: (1) options of any kind; (2) contracts that provide for a purchase, sale or payment that is
contingent on a financial, economic or commercial event
(e.g., CDS); (3) executory exchange payment contracts based
on the value or level of an underlying asset that transfers financial risk associated with it (not a property interest); and
(4) other contracts commonly known as swaps.


Exclusions: security-based swaps (other than “mixed
swaps”) and the transactions qualifying for a specific
exclusion.161

160 Commodity Exchange Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(a)(47), as amended by the Dodd
Frank Act, § 721, and further defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC
and the SEC (77 FR 48356, Aug. 13, 2012).
161 Inter alia: (1) Listed futures; (2) options on securities and indices that are
subject to US securities laws; (3) physically-settled security forwards subject to US
securities laws (unless contingent on a third-party credit event); (4) debt securities
subject to US securities laws; (5) certain physically-settled commodity forwards;
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“Security-based swaps”162 include swaps based on (1) a single security or loan; (2) a “narrow-based security index”
(generally, 9 or less); (3) events relating to an issuer of securities or issuers of securities in a “narrow-based security index” (e.g., single-name CDS).


Exclusions: transactions excluded from “swap” definition and derivatives on US government or agency
securities.

As we can see, the division of the primary regulatory authority
between the CFTC for swap transactions and the SEC for securitybased swap transactions is reflected in defining these instruments in
separate provisions. Security-based swaps are essentially limited to
swaps based on single securities, single loans or narrow-based securities indices, and the CFTC regulates all other swaps. Mixed swap
transactions that have characteristics of both swaps and securitybased swaps, are subject to dual jurisdiction of the CFTC and the
SEC.
3.2.2.2. European Union
Under the EMIR, “derivative” or “derivative contract,” includes
options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and other derivative contracts in relation to a very broad range of underliers.163
“OTC derivative,” or “OTC derivative contract,” means a derivative
contract that is not executed on a regulated market or on a thirdcountry market considered as equivalent to a regulated market.164
Despite a rather broad definition of derivatives, there are certain
transactions not mentioned by the EMIR and MiFID (and MiFID II)
and therefore do not fall within the scope of the new regulation, e.g.,
(6) Foreign Exchange (FX) spots (if not “rolling spots”); (7) certain physically-settled
FX forwards and swaps (certain requirements still apply); (8) transactions with the
US government or a US agency backed by full faith and credit of the United States;
(9) specified “Consumer” and “Commercial” Transactions (10) certain regulated insurance products.
162 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(68), as amended by § 721 of the Dodd
Frank Act, and further defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the
SEC (77 FR 48356, Aug. 13, 2012).
163 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 2(5) (by reference to points (4) to (10) of Section C
of Annex I to MiFID). The relevant sections of the MiFID II are pretty much the
same.
164 Id. art. 2(7).
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inter alia: (1) spot transactions; (2) certain physically-settled commodity and exotic underliers transactions; (3) FX spots (if not "rolling spots").
3.2.2.3. US vs. EU
The US and European approaches to defining derivatives differ
significantly, which inevitably leads to further distinctions in the
overall derivatives market regulation.
First of all, the EMIR, along with MIFID, introduces a new definition of derivatives, whereas the Dodd Frank Act does not define
them at all but rather contains a very broad definition of swaps. If
the main purpose of the regulation was to introduce a harmonized
framework for all derivatives, the question arises: Why did the US
legislators choose not to work out a comprehensive definition of derivatives?165 One possible explanation goes back to the issues discussed in section 3.2.1. of this Part, i.e., regulatory authorities. Obviously, division of all instruments covered by the Dodd Frank Act
into swaps and security-based swaps justifies the existence of the
two regulatory agencies as opposed to having one authority in case
of a unified category of derivatives. This does not mean that the
American Government simply wants to have two agencies instead
of one. The logic seems to lie behind the idea of maintaining the
powers of the SEC to regulate securities and of the CFTC to regulate
commodities. Another justification of this structure relates to the
point that the legislators had the intent to regulate only the new instruments and leave the existing ones—i.e., futures—subject to existing regulation under the CEA.166
Another distinction, evident even through a very high-level
comparative analysis, is that the EMIR definition of derivatives has
a broader and less fragmented scope, including almost any kind of
derivatives. The Dodd Frank Act, in contrast, does not include any
futures or physically-settled commodity forwards for the reason
mentioned above—i.e., they are all regulated by the CEA. Moreover, almost all CDSs fall within the definition of swaps under the
Dodd Frank Act except only single-name CDSs as long as they are
based on events relating to one or more reference securities. Even
165
166

Scalcione, supra note 7, at 358.
Id. at 359.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3

2016]

FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES

991

though the SEC and CFTC should consult with each other before
issuing rules in order to make such rules consistent, such classification of instruments creates diversity and therefore leaves opportunity for fragmentation and different treatment of incredibly similar instruments. Certainly, it could be the case that the purpose of
Congress was to leave the distinction between the instruments
based on the nature of their underlier (commodity vs. security) rather than treating them all with regard to their common economic
function. However, this seems neither convincing nor efficient
when considering possible significant differences in further regulation.
Thus, the practical difference in the US and EU approaches is
that the former appears to be more fragmented and covers fewer
number of instruments. For instance, listed futures are regulated by
the EMIR, but fall outside the definition of swap under the Dodd
Frank Act as they are covered by the CEA. The scope of the Dodd
Frank is further fragmented by the division of instruments into
swaps and security-based swaps depending on their underliers and
by the division of the authority to oversee these instruments between two agencies—the CFTC and the SEC accordingly.
Finally, from a standpoint of statute-drafting technique, the definition of swaps under the Dodd Frank Act is more remote from the
standard market and finance practices. For instance, options have
never been considered swaps in the finance world even though they
are defined as swaps by the Dodd Frank Act. Such confusion could
have been escaped by simply listing options separately from
swaps,167 but the legislators preferred, instead, to create a unified
category of swaps.
Despite the specified disadvantages of the US approach in defining the instruments included in the scope of the regulation, it shall
be fairly noted that the European definition of derivatives, although
broader in scope, is much less detailed and thorough in specifying
the instruments covered. The MIFID, as well as its future substitute
MIFID II, simply lists the types of instruments that are considered
derivatives–i.e., swaps, futures, options—without defining or enumerating the content of these instruments, as is done in very much
detail in the Dodd Frank Act. Moreover, the European statutes do
not explicitly determine which instruments are not covered. This
167

Id. at 358.
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creates confusion for the market participants, who have to understand which transactions fall under the regulation. On the other
hand, the relatively broad definition of the derivatives makes it easier for the regulators to include exotic derivatives that can be developed in the future.
Nevertheless, overall, the European approach seems to be better
tailored and more comprehensive—its unified category of both derivatives and OTC derivatives leaves almost no room for divergent
interpretations. This means that the regulation is not locked in a
narrow group of instruments and its detailed scope can be easily adjusted via technical standards according to the current market conditions without the necessity of amending the regulation itself, for
instance, in case of new exotic derivatives development.
3.2.3. Covered Parties
The scope of the parties covered is another sensitive regulatory
area, which directly affects market participants and sets up certain
constraints on them. Different approaches as to covered parties may
lead to different results in terms of the effectiveness of the overall
regulation. More importantly, regulation of market participants has
a direct effect on determining the major actors of the derivatives
market in the future.
3.2.3.1. United States
The Dodd Frank Act functionally covers all parties entering into
a swap contract by imposing registration requirements as long as
one party is a derivative dealer or holds substantial derivatives positions. The legislation introduces definitions of “swap dealer” and
of “major swap participant” in the CEA and similar definitions of
“security-based swap dealer” and of “major security-based swap
participant” in the 1934 Act.168
Swap (security-based swap) dealer is defined as any person
who: (1) holds himself or herself out as a dealer in swaps (securitybased swap); (2) makes a market in swaps (security-based swaps);

168 Dodd Frank Act, § 721(49)(A) and 761(71)(A) accordingly, and as further
defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the SEC: (1) CEA § 1a(49)
of the Act and 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg) – swap dealer; (2) ’34 Act §3(a)(71) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3a71–1 - security-based swap dealer.
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(3) regularly enters into swaps (security-based swap) as counterparty in the course of business for his or her own account; or (4) engages in activity regularly considered in the trade as making a market for swap (security-based swap).169 However, the term “swap
(security-based swap) dealer” does not include a person that enters
into swaps (security-based swaps) for such person's own account,
either individually or in a fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of
regular business.170
Major swap (security-based swap) participant is a person that is
not a swap (security-based swap) dealer and: (1) maintains a “substantial position” in a major swap category excluding hedging or
mitigating for commercial risk or positions maintained by any employee benefit plan; or (2) has outstanding swaps that create substantial exposure that could have adverse effects on financial stability of the US banking system or financial markets; or (3) any
financial entity that is highly leveraged relative to the capital it holds
and is not subject to a capital adequacy requirement and maintain a
substantial position in a major swap (security-based swap) category.171
Finally, another category that has to be mentioned is that of “eligible contract participant,” a new category introduced by the Dodd
Frank Act.172 The regulation makes it unlawful for a person that is
not an eligible contract participant to enter into a swap (securitybased swap) unless that swap (security-based swap) is entered into
over a board of trade that has been designated by the CFTC as a
169 Id. The latter criterion is subject to a de minimus exemption defined by the
CFTC and the SEC for swap dealers and security-based swap dealers under the
Dodd Frank Act § 721(49)(D) and 761(71)(D) accordingly. Such exemption is determined in C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(3) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71–2 for swap dealer and security-based swap dealers accordingly.
170 See C.F.R. §1.3(ggg); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71–1 accordingly (defining
swap dealer.)
171 Dodd Frank Act §721(33)(A) and 761(67)(A) accordingly, and as further defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the SEC: (1) CEA §1a(33) of
the Act and C.F.R. § 1.3(hhh) – major swap participant; (2) ’34 Act § 3(a)(67) and
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a67–1- major security-based swap participant. The CFTC and the
SEC have further adopted rules to determine such categories as “substantial position”, “financial entity,” “high leverage,” “substantial counterparty exposure,” and
“hedging or mitigating commercial risk;” see generally, C.F.R. § 1.3(hhh) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.3a67 accordingly (defining major swap participant).
172 Dodd Frank Act § 723 for swaps and § 763 for security based swaps (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) accordingly).
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contract market.173 An eligible contract participant is defined as an
entity or an individual that satisfies specific criteria enumerated in
the statute,174 as further implemented by CFTC rules.175
The Dodd Frank Act also contains more specific provisions regulating swap trading by banks:


“Push-Out Provision”176 stating that no Federal
assistance177 will be provided to any swaps entity178 with respect to any swap, security-based
swap, or other activity of the swaps entity.

Id.
CEA § 1(a)(18).
175 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(m). Under this Rule, major swap (security-based swap) participants and swap (security-based swap) dealers are also considered within the
category of an eligible contract participant.
176 Dodd Frank Act § 716 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305), as amended by Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113—235
(2014).
177 “Federal assistance” is defined as the use of any advances from any Federal
Reserve credit facility or discount window that is not part of a program or facility
with broad-based eligibility under section 343(3)(A) of Title 12, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance or guarantees for the purpose of: (A) making any
loan to, or purchasing any stock, equity interest, or debt obligation of, any swaps
entity; (B) purchasing the assets of any swaps entity; (C) guaranteeing any loan or
debt issuance of any swaps entity; or (D) entering into any assistance arrangement
(including tax breaks), loss sharing, or profit sharing with any swaps entity.
178 “Swaps entity” is defined as any swap (security-based swap) dealer or major swap (security-based swap) participant, except major swap (security-based
swap) participant that is a covered depository institution, provided that it limits its
swap and security-based swap activities to the following: (1) hedging and other
similar risk mitigation activities; (2) non-structured finance swap activities; (3) certain structured finance swap activities (undertaken for hedging or risk management
purposes or if each asset-backed security underlying such structured finance swaps
is of a credit quality and of a type or category with respect to which the prudential
regulators have jointly adopted rules authorizing swap or security-based swap activity by covered depository institutions). The term “covered depository institution” means (1) an insured depository institution, as that term is defined in section
3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813); and (2) a United States
uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank. However, certain restrictions on
covered depository institutions still apply, including ban on proprietary trading
(“Volcker Rule”).
173
174
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“Volcker Rule”179 prohibiting a banking entity
from (1) engaging in proprietary trading;180 or (2)
acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or
other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge
fund or a private equity.

Thus, the Dodd Frank Act amended prior legislation to ensure
that individuals engaged in the business of buying and selling
swaps on behalf of themselves or others would now be regulated.
3.2.3.2. European Union
The EMIR does not make the same distinction of covered persons as the Dodd Frank Act does in terms of swap dealers and major
market participants. Instead, the EMIR focuses on defining coverage in terms of the nature of the parties involved in the transaction
or, more specifically, their business purposes rather than on transaction type.
Under the provisions of the EMIR, covered participants are classified as financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties.
The financial counterparty is defined as an organization in the financial industry as authorized by various EC Directives and generally
includes investment firms, banks and other credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance companies, and certain asset management
companies.181 A non-financial counterparty is an undertaking established in the EU that does not fit the definition of a financial counterparty or of a CCP.182

Dodd Frank Act § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
“Proprietary trading” is defined as engaging as a principal for the trading
account of a banking organization or supervised nonbank financial company in any
transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of any: (1) security;
(2) derivative; (3) contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery; (4) option on
any such security, derivative, or contract; or (5) any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the SEC and the CFTC may
determine. However, the Volcker Rule does specifically permit certain trading
transactions, inter alia: (1) in government securities; (2) in connection with underwriting or market-making, to the extent that either does not exceed near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties; (3) on behalf of customers; or (4) by
an insurance business for the general account of the insurance company; (5) certain
risk-mitigating hedging.
181 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 2(8).
182 Id. art 2(9).
179
180
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While ESMA has not issued definitive rules concerning covered
party determinations, the rules that will be established are likely to
be relatively broad and therefore consistent with the general regulatory trend of covering as many parties as possible while providing
exemptions based on transaction type. As a result, the majority of
entities engaged in OTC transactions in the EU are likely to be considered covered parties.
3.2.3.3. US vs. EU
The Dodd Frank approach to covered parties creates categories
of market participants and establishes threshold criteria for the parties to be covered by the statute. Once a party meets the coverage
criteria, all of the provisions of the statute and rules of the various
regulatory agencies apply. In contrast, the EMIR approach establishes two categories of market participants covered by the regulation. While a particular transaction may be excluded from coverage,
the parties are generally covered.
On the one hand, the US approach seems very flexible as only
parties involved in qualifying transactions are subject to regulation,
whereas all others fall outside the regulation.183 However, such a
regulatory scheme creates fragmentation as parties who use swaps
only infrequently remain unregulated.184 In other words, the US regime looks to be oriented only towards professional swap traders.
Again, since the Dodd Frank Act was a response to the financial crisis, it could be the case that the intent of the legislators was to regulate only major derivatives players in order to enable regulators to
monitor and avoid a repeat of the large financial exposures and failures that took place in 2008. The European framework has a broader
scope of parties covered and, again, seems to be much more comprehensive as it allows to simply treat market participants differently within the regulation as opposed to leaving some of them completely unregulated.
Moreover, as fairly noticed by commentators,185 the US “product-by-product” regulation could hardly be manageable, both for
the participants to comply with it as well as for the regulators to
183
184
185

Scalcione, supra note 7, at 361.
Id.
Id.
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monitor participants. The European approach of regulating all entities’ trading derivatives, rather than adopting a “product-by-product” approach, is much more efficient as it captures major participants as well as less significant derivatives trading. That said, the
comprehensive approach is a much more intrusive form of regulation.
The Dodd Frank Act is also distinct from the EMIR as it contains
specific “healthy” provisions regulating swap trading by banks.
The effect of the Volcker Rule is considered to be the transition of
swap trading from banks that are “too big to fail” to less systemically
risky parts of the market.186 The Push-Out Rule was also initially
intended to move risky swap trades into a more diverse framework,
within which speculation would be less impactful on the prices of
underliers.187
There were, as is always the case with new regulation, certain
concerns with regard to the Push-Out Rule. For instance, US dealers
might consider moving their business to broker-dealer subsidiaries
in other jurisdictions, which could make it difficult and complex to
close positions and therefore potentially increase systemic risk.188
Another argument against the Push-Out Rule is that it is unnecessary, as market risks posed by “pushed-out” derivatives can be negated through offsetting positions. The Volcker Rule is criticized as
leaving a loophole for “embedded proprietary trading,” when a
bank betting on the direction of a market “may just avoid hedging
the opposite side of a client order,”189 and that is perfectly permissible under the Rule. These concerns are fair, but not perfect, as, for
instance, it is not always the case that an offsetting position exists.190

Greenberger, Overwhelming, supra note 76, at 163.
Id.
188 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, SWAPS PUSH-OUT TO HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON
U.S. DEALERS 2 (June 21, 2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_ storage/www.complianceweek.com/ContentPages/139709745.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUN2-YMV7].
189 Matthew Leising, Dropping Swaps Plan for Volcker Rule May Not Reduce Bank
Risk, BLOOMBERG, June 11, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2010-06-11/dropping-swaps-plan-for-volcker-rule-may-still-allow-banks-totake-risks [perma.cc/C83E-2X3L].
190 Adam J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The
Costs, Risks and Politics, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 269, 286 (2011).
186
187
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Nevertheless, under the pressure of criticism, the Push-Out Rule
has been recently amended by: (1) extending the coverage of its exemption to uninsured US branches or agencies of foreign banks;191
and (2) significantly narrowing the scope of instruments subject to
the push-out requirement by the exempted parties by limiting it to
swaps (security-based swaps) based on asset-backed securities. Obviously, such an amendment is the result of the lobbying efforts of
big banks, as large institutions always want to be free to speculate
on such opaque financial instruments as derivatives and, at the same
time, to have the “Too Big to Fail” guarantee from the government.
Despite being controversial to a certain extent and making trading
rather complex, the overall positive effect of the original Push-Out
provision seemed much more meaningful than its potential costs.
Now, even though the Push-Out Rule nominally still exists, and the
Volcker Rule still imposes limitations on big banks, the amendment
of the Push Out requirement is a negative precedent in the context
of the repeal of financial regulation.
The advantage of the Dodd Frank over the EMIR approach, on
the one hand, could be that the regulatory agencies may amend the
rules and determine whether a person's OTC trading activity meets
the threshold for coverage. However, the categories of swap dealers
and major swap participants seem to be excessively complicated in
comparison with the EMIR approach. For instance, the CFTC rules
for assessing whether a person is a swap dealer or a major market
participant focus on the total value of transactions, whereas the volume of transactions can vary so that a person could be a covered
party at one time and not a covered party at another time. In contrast, the EMIR approach appears to be rather simple covering all
financial and non-financial entities with exclusions based on the nature of the transactions. Nevertheless, none of the approaches seems
to be perfect, and some sort of their combination would be much
more appropriate and efficient.192
The scope of the parties covered differs like all previously discussed areas of the US and EU regulations. However, in this case, it
is much harder to give preference to either approach as both have
their own benefits and disadvantages. Overall, the EU regime seems

191
192

Previously, only insured depository institutions were exempted.
To be discussed in more detail further.
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more comprehensive, meaning broader in its scope, whereas the US
scheme is much more detailed, i.e., focused on specific issues.
3.2.4. Clearing, Trading and Reporting Requirements
Clearing requirements have always been the central issue
among scholars and has become the “heart” of derivatives regulation both in the US and Europe. Clearinghouses or CCPs connect
buyers and sellers of derivatives contracts by receiving and distributing payments associated with derivatives contracts. A properly
functioning CCP helps the parties in a financial contract manage
counterparty risk and improves transparency by providing continuous mark-to-market information about the value of the derivatives
and their collateral. The establishment of special trading platforms
is a higher level of regulation, as the derivatives have to go through
a clearing process before entering trading execution facilities. Interestingly enough, the statistical data shows that approximately over
70% of interest rate derivatives and CDSs are cleared through clearing houses, whereas more than 60% of those instruments are traded
on swap execution facilities.193 Thus, the proper clearing and trading requirements are crucial for the overall derivative’s regulatory
framework. Finally, reporting requirements help the regulators
keep track of the derivatives transactions and provide information
about them to the public.
3.2.4.1. United States
3.2.4.1.1. Clearing
The Dodd Frank Act prohibits swap (security-based swap)
trades that have not been cleared to a DCO registered with the CFTC
or to a clearing agency with the SEC, or exempt from registration if

193 According to ISDA SwapsInfo comparative analysis (2015 year-to-date vs.
2014 year-to-date) for the week ending March 27, 2015, 72% of interest rate derivatives total notional was cleared versus 77%, whereas statistics for CDSs are 81% and
62% respectively. However, only 62% of interest rate derivatives total notional was
executed on SEFs versus 52%, and 71% of CDSs total notional was executed on SEFs
vs. 45%. See ISDA, IRD and CDS Weekly Analysis: week ending March 27, 2015,
http://www.swapsinfo.org/market-analysis/ [perma.cc/2D6S-VRHY] (describing fluctuation in notionals and trade counts for the week.)
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the swap (security-based swap) is required to be cleared.194 Swaps
(security based swaps) become subject to mandatory clearing upon
issuance of a mandatory clearing determination by the CFTC or the
SEC.195 Moreover, DCOs (clearing agencies) have to submit all
swaps (security-based swaps) that they plan to accept for clearing to
the CFTC or the SEC for review and final determination on clearing.196 Thus, the final decision on clearing rests always with the
CFTC or the SEC.
Nonetheless, transactions that would otherwise be subject to
mandatory clearing may fall into one of several exceptions to the
clearing requirement. First, there is a so-called “end-user” exemption, according to which the clearing requirements do not apply if
any of the counterparties to the swap (security-based swap): (1) are
not a financial entity;197 (2) use the swap (security-based swap) to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (3) make a showing to the
CFTC or SEC, accordingly, that it generally meets its financial obligations related to such non-cleared swap (security-based swap).198
Certain exemptions may also apply to affiliates of such “end-users”.199 Second, the CFTC or the SEC may consider exempting small
194 Dodd Frank Act § 723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly). However, the regulators
should consider the following factors when deciding on clearing requirement: (i)
liquidity, volume, and availability of pricing data; (ii) operational ability to clear
the contract; (iii) effect on systemic risk; (iv) effect on competition; and (v) legal
certainty of the contract in the event of insolvency of the derivatives clearing organization standing behind the contract.
195 Id. The CFTC issued rules determining the first group of clearable swaps
that mostly consists of interest rate and some credit swaps. See Clearing Requirement
Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284 (Dec. 13, 2012).
196 Id.
197 The term “financial entity” includes: (1) a swap dealer; (2) a security-based
swap dealer; (3) a major swap participant; (4) a major security-based swap participant; (5) a commodity pool; (6) a private fund; (7) an employee benefit plan; (8) a
person predominantly engaged in banking or financial activities. 17 § C.F.R. 23.505
(2013).
198 Dodd Frank Act §723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly). However, the “enduser” may still decide to clear the transaction. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3
(2010).
199 An affiliate of a person that qualifies for an “end-user” exception (including
affiliate entities predominantly engaged in providing financing for the purchase of
the merchandise or manufactured goods of the person) may qualify for the exception only if the affiliate, acting on behalf of the person and as an agent, uses the
swap (security-based swap) to hedge or mitigate the commercial risk of the person
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banks, savings associations, farm credit system institutions, and
credit unions depending on their total assets threshold.200 Also,
swaps (security-based swaps) entered into prior to the effective date
or application of a clearing requirement need not be cleared if they
are appropriately reported.201 Finally, the CFTC and the SEC cannot
adopt rules requiring a DCO (clearing agency) to list for clearing a
swap (security-based swap) if that would threaten the financial integrity of the DCO (clearing agency).202 Dodd Frank, however, with
regard to all uncleared swaps (security-based swaps), mandates203
the imposition of regulatory margin requirements204 on swap (security-based swap) dealers and major swap (security-based swap) participants as well as requirements to segregate205 initial margin on request of the counterparty.
3.2.4.1.2. Trade Execution
The Dodd Frank Act requires that all swaps (security-based
swaps) that are subject to mandatory clearing be traded on a designated contract market (exchange) or through a swap (security-based
swap) execution facility (either registered or exempt from registration).206 However, such trade execution requirements do not apply
if no designated contract market (exchange) or swap (security-based
swap) execution facility makes the swap (security-based swap)
or other affiliate of the person that is not a financial entity. However, such affiliate
is not exempt if it is: (1) a swap dealer; (2) a security-based swap dealer; (3) a major
swap participant; (4) a major security-based swap participant; (5) an issuer that
would be an investment company; (6) a commodity pool; or (7) a bank holding
company with over $50,000,000,000 in consolidated assets. 17 § C.F.R. 23.505 (2013).
200 Dodd Frank Act §723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15
U.S.C. § 78c–3 (2010).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Margin requirements are set up by the CFTC or the SEC, accordingly, or
prudential bank regulators if swap (security-based swap) dealers and major swap
(security-based swap) participants are banks.
204 Dodd Frank Act §731 for swaps and 763 for security-based swaps (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 6s and 15 U.S.C. § 78o–10 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 6s (2010); 15 U.S.C. §
78o–10 (2010).
205 Dodd Frank Act §724 for swaps and 763 for security-based swaps (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 6s and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–5 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 6s (2010); 15 U.S.C. §
78c–5 (2010).
206 Id.
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available to trade or for transactions subject to the clearing exceptions.207
3.2.4.1.3. Reporting
The Dodd Frank Act requires several types of reporting of swap
(security-based swap) transactions. First, every cleared swap (security-based swap), whether required to be cleared or not, is subject to
“real-time public reporting.”208 However, trades entered into prior
to the effective date or application of a clearing requirement have to
be reported in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions or market positions of any persons.209 Second, each swap (security-based swap), whether cleared or not, must also be reported to
a registered security-based swap data repository.210 Swaps (security-based swaps) not accepted for clearing by any DCO (clearing
agency) are reported to a swap data repository or, in the case in
which there is no swap data repository that would accept them, to
the CFTC or the SEC, accordingly.211
3.2.4.2. European Union
3.2.4.2.1. Clearing
The EMIR may require OTC derivatives to be cleared, depending on the following two factors: (1) their type (class); and (2) counterparties. The EMIR establishes two possible ways to determine
OTC derivatives classes that are subject to a clearing requirement.212
First, when a competent Member State authority authorizes a CCP
to clear a class of OTC derivatives, the ESMA has to be immediately
Id.
Dodd Frank Act §727 for swaps and 763(i) for security-based swaps (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78m accordingly). The term “real-time public
reporting” is defined as to report data relating to a swap (security-based swap)
transaction, including price and volume, as soon as technologically practicable after
the time at which the swap (security-based swap) transaction has been executed. 7
U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2010).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Dodd Frank Act §729 for swaps and 766 for security-based swaps (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 6r and 15 U.S.C. § 78m–1 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 6r (2010); 15 U.S.C. §
78m-l (2010).
212 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 5.
207
208
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notified.213 After receiving such notification, the ESMA develops
and submits to the European Commission draft regulatory technical
standards specifying the class of OTC derivatives that should be
cleared.214 Second, the ESMA can, on its own initiative, identify and
notify the European Commission the classes of derivatives that
should be subject to the clearing obligation, but for which no CCP
has yet received authorization.215
However, only the OTC derivative contracts concluded between
the following counterparties have to be cleared:216 (1) two financial
counterparties; (2) a financial counterparty and a non-financial
above the clearing threshold;217 (3) two non-financial counterparties
above the clearing threshold; (4) a financial counterparty or a nonfinancial counterparty above the clearing threshold and an entity established in a third country that would be subject to the clearing obligation if it were established in the EU; or (5) two entities established in one or more third-countries that would be subject to the
clearing obligation if they were established in the EU.218
There are several exceptions to this rule. First, the Regulation
exempts from clearing historical trades under certain conditions.219
Id. art. 5(1).
Id. art 5(2). Additionally, the ESMA has also to specify: (1) the date or dates
from which the clearing obligation takes effect; and (2) the minimum remaining
maturity in order to be subject to clearing for the OTC derivative contracts entered
(novated) on or after notification of a CCP to ESMA but before the date from which
the clearing obligation takes effect.
215 Id. art. 5(3). The ESMA takes into account several criteria, such as the degree
of standardization, volume, liquidity and the availability of reliable pricing while
determining classes of OTC derivatives to be cleared (Article 5(4)). The ESMA has
also to establish, maintain and keep up to date a public register in order to identify
the classes of OTC derivatives subject to the clearing obligation (Article 6(1)).
216 Id. art 4(1).
217 According to EMIR, supra note 136, art. 10(1)(b), a non-financial counterparty becomes subject to the clearing for future contracts if the rolling average position over 30 days exceeds the threshold set up by the ESMA for certain classes of
OTC derivatives.
218 Provided that the contract has a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect
within the Union or where such an obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent
the evasion of any provisions of the EMIR. Id.
219 Id. art. 4(1). Exemption covers the contracts entered (or novated) on or after:
(1) the date from which the clearing obligation takes effect; or (2) notification of a
CCP to the ESMA but before the date from which the clearing obligation takes effect
if the contracts do not have a minimum remaining maturity determined by the
ESMA. Id. art. 4(1).
213
214
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Second, the EMIR provides a clearing exception for intra-group
transactions that meet specified conditions.220 Finally, there is a
time-limited221 exception that exempts from clearing OTC derivative
contracts that are objectively measurable as reducing investment
risks directly relating to the financial solvency of pension scheme
arrangements.222 There is no explicit end-user exemption, but transactions involving non-financial counterparties below the clearing
threshold will not be subject to the clearing obligation.
However, for uncleared OTC derivatives, the EMIR sets forth
certain requirements. First, financial counterparties and nonfinancial counterparties have to ensure arrangements to measure, monitor, and mitigate operational and credit risk.223 Additionally, financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties above the
clearing threshold are required to have procedures for the timely,
accurate, and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral with
respect to OTC derivative contracts and daily “mark-to-market” accounting.224
3.2.4.2.2. Trade Execution
The EMIR itself does not impose mandatory trading requirements. These requirements are contained in the MiFID II / MiFIR.
In general, the MiFIR requires the ESMA to determine the classes of
derivatives that are subject to mandatory venue execution.225 Additionally, when the mandatory venue execution obligation is to take
effect, derivatives must be subject to the clearing obligation under
the EMIR, admitted to trading or traded on at least one trading

220 Id. art. 4(2). Exemption is for cases, where the counterparties have notified
their regulators that they intend to use the exemption (or, where the transaction is
between an EU and non-EU entity, where the EU entity has obtained authorization
from its regulator to use the exemption).
221 For three years after the entry into force of the EMIR, i.e. by Aug. 16, 2015.
Id. art. 89(1).
222 Id.
223 Id. art. 11(1).
224 Id. art. 11(2); 11(3). Where market conditions do not allow marketing to
market, they shall mark to model. Financial counterparties are also required to hold
appropriate capital to cover risks not covered by collateral Id. art. 11(4).
225 MiFIR supra note 138, art. 32(1).
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venue (i.e., regulated market, MTF226, OTF227 or a third country trading venue228), and be sufficiently liquid to trade only on these venues.229
3.2.4.2.3. Reporting
Under the EMIR, counterparties and CCPs have to ensure that
the details of any derivative contract they have concluded (and any
modification or termination of that contract) are reported to a registered trade repository (or where no relevant trade repository available, to the ESMA).230 Trade repositories have to then publish aggregate positions, arranged by class of derivatives, on the contracts
reported to it.231
3.2.4.3. US vs. EU
3.2.4.3.1. Clearing
In general, the US and EU similarly approach the imposition of
clearing requirements on a broadly defined class of OTC derivatives
and leave to relevant regulators the final decision on the application
of the clearing obligation application to a particular class of OTC derivatives. This approach seems rather prudent as it may take time
to completely analyze the OTC market and understand how to
structure the clearing requirements regarding certain classes of derivatives in the most appropriate way.
By adopting legislation mandating the use of CCPs in the OTC
derivatives market, the Congress and the European Commission allegedly aimed to use central clearing as a tool for reducing systemic

Multilateral Trading Facility.
Organized Trading Facility.
228 MiFIR, supra note 138, art. 28(1). Provided that the European Commission
deemed such third country trading venues to be subject to equivalent regulatory
requirements to EU trading venues and provided that the third country provides
for an effective equivalent system for the recognition of trading venues authorized
under MiFID II to admit to trading or trade derivatives declared subject to a trading
obligation in that third country on a non-exclusive basis.
229 Id. art. 32(2).
230 Eur. Parl. Regulation 648/2012, art. 9(1), 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU).
231 Id. art. 81(1).
226
227
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risk.232 However, there is a concern that systemic risk, on the contrary, could increase because of the imposition of a central clearing
requirement, which establishes such “systematically important” organizations as CCPs and “eliminates opportunities for bilateral netting.”233 Thus, a major concern is connected with the possibility of
creating one or several “Too Big To Fail” entities234 instead of having
numerous, or at least, many more entities as it previously was. In
other words, commentators do not like CCPs being “multiplied versions” of companies like AIG. Such concerns are fair enough from
the standpoint of systemic risk concentration, as the consequences
of a CCP failure would be immense. Nevertheless, there are several
reasons why having central counterparties is critically important for
reducing systemic risk. First, the regulators can detect any problems
of a CCP much more easily and quickly than of an independent participant like AIG. Moreover, it would be even better in this regard
if only one dominant CCP emerges rather than several of them,235 so
that the regulators have to monitor only one CCP. Besides, CCPs’
operations are much less complex than those of financial institutions
such as banks, as a CCP focuses on a single type of business.236 Furthermore, CCPs are obliged to use such risk-reducing tools such as
margin and collateral requirements. Finally, the operation of clearing houses that themselves are less opaque than banks increases the
overall transparency of the derivatives market as CCPs serve as important information sources.
There is also an issue related to the capability of certain instruments to be cleared. For effective implementation of central clearing, two conditions are required: standard terms and high trading
volume.237 These conditions are necessary for successful CCP risk
232 Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and OTC Derivatives: The Impact of
Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives Market, 44 Int'l Law. 1077,
1106 (2010).
233 Id.
234 Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument
for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol’y 209, 259 (2014).
235 David A. Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 72 (2010).
236 Id.
237 Richard Heffner, The Regulation of Multilateral Clearing in the United Kingdom
and United States, Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Dick Frase & Helen
Parry eds., 99 (2002).
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management,238 i.e.: (1) standard terms for a valuation model of the
derivative239 and (2) high trading volume for making clearing costs
effective for a CCP.240 Thus, the decrease of standardization and increase of complexity make modeling of the derivatives harder and
much more expensive for the CCP,241 whereas without such modeling it will be impossible to appropriately measure and manage risks
through just margin requirements imposed on clearing members.242
Furthermore, the absence of high trading volume, i.e. low liquidity,
could make the CCP unable to plan for the liquidation of a defaulting position in the derivative, which may eventually lead to significant losses for the CCP.243 Therefore, clearing is not the optimal solution for all derivatives and regulators have to take this into
consideration when determining the classes of derivatives that will
be subject to the central clearing requirement. The EMIR and the
Dodd Frank Act, with regard to this issue, are fairly accurate and
prudent in their language requiring the regulators to consider the
level of standardization, trade volume, and other factors when defining derivatives to be cleared.
However, it shall be noted that imposing a clearing requirement
only on standard and frequently traded derivatives will not completely solve the problem and may even create certain new issues.
First, this will leave outside the clearing houses instruments that
caused major concern in 2008, such as CDSs, as they are generally
very customized contracts. Moreover, by clearing only certain classes of derivatives, the OTC derivatives trades of the market participants will be divided into bilateral and centrally cleared portfolios,
which, on the one hand, will provide additional opportunities for
multilateral netting of the cleared instruments, but on the other, reduce the opportunities for bilateral netting that existed initially

238 Bank for International Settlements, New Developments in Settlement and
Clearing Arrangements for OTC Derivatives 27 (Mar. 2007), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7XT-BAT5] (hereinafter New
Developments).
239 Id.
240 Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Theo Lubke, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 424 Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 8 (2010).
241 Id.
242 New Developments, supra note 239.
243 Id.; Duffie et al., supra note 241.
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when the whole OTC market was not subject to clearing.244 Therefore, it would be beneficial if the regulators direct their efforts to encouraging derivatives standardization and clearing, since in order
“[t]o fully achieve the benefits of central clearing, a critical mass of
OTC derivatives products must move to [the] CCPs”.245 Otherwise,
central clearing may actually increase net counterparty exposure
and lead to financial instability.246 However, it seems impossible
and non-practical to standardize all OTC derivatives, because, as
mentioned above, their attractiveness to the market participants inheres in their ability to be tailored to the specific needs of the parties
as much as necessary. A partial solution for the underlined issues
has been already offered by the legislators in both regimes–namely,
the imposition of reporting and margin requirements on the uncleared derivatives. This will, at least, reduce the counterparty risk
and make the market more transparent.
Another sensitive area regarding the clearing requirement relates to the “end-user” exemption. Both the EMIR and the DoddFrank Act provide certain exceptions for transactions aimed at hedging commercial risks. However, the US regulation contains a rather
narrow definition of an “end-user”, whereas the EMIR simply excludes non-financial counterparties below the clearing threshold.
Thus, both regimes explicitly do not exclude any financial entities
from the clearing requirement. In the US, commentators expressed
their concern about the fact that the end-user exception would not
cover certain market participants not qualifying as end-users, (such
as small banks) but who, at the same time, are not systematically
significant and cannot afford to meet clearing requirements.247 Another concern relates to the margin and collateral requirements for

McBride, supra note 233.
Fin. Stability Bd, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform (Oct. 25,
2010), http://www.fsb.org/2010/10/fsb-report-on-implementing-otc-derivativesmarket-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/YZ82-VPSP ].
246 Darrell Duffie, Policy Issues Facing the Market for Credit Derivatives, in T HE
ROAD A HEAD FOR THE F ED 107, 111-12 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009)
247 Letter from Nat'l Rural Util. Cooperative Fin. Corp., to David A. Stawick,
Secretary of the Comm'n, CFTC (Jan. 12, 2011).
244
245
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all uncleared derivatives, including end-users, as these requirements create additional costs for end-users that may be transferred
to the consumer.248
One possible solution could be broadening the definition of
“end-users” and requiring greater disclosure from these end-users,
instead of imposing margin requirements on them.249 However,
such a solution would still be incomplete. From the standpoint of
regulating derivatives to lessen the level of systemic risk, both margin requirements and extensive disclosure are critically important
and are not interchangeable, especially for counterparties that deal
with each other bilaterally rather than through CCPs. What the regulators in both the US and EU could do is broaden the definition of
“end-user” to include additional participants that meet a clearing
threshold, i.e., something similar to what the EMIR does for the nonfinancial counterparties. But such a threshold has to be set only after
accurate analysis of the market—anything else could produce a situation where many real “hedgers” will not fall under the exception
due to the high volume of their derivatives trading. This is sometimes the case with the de minimis threshold set by the SEC and the
CFTC, a problem that the regulators acknowledge.
Finally, it is very important to have an explicit end-user exemption as opposed to having an implied exception as in the European
regulation, which excludes only non-financial counterparties below
a clearing threshold. However, another issue that may arise is that
of distinguishing hedging from speculating and trading, as in the
real world the line between these practices could be very thin. It is
very hard to find a “one size fits all” solution, as it seems that
whether a party is hedging or not has to be determined on a caseby-case basis. Nevertheless, the regulators and, possibly, the courts
can develop evidentiary factors that suggest hedging has taken
place. Preliminarily, such factors could be the existence of commercial risk for the company without using derivatives, the dependence
on the hedged underlier, and the intention of the company’s representatives involved in entering derivatives. Since the decision to engage in hedging is not made in a day, the company should have a
248 Katharine
Rose, Annuity Issuers Eye Dodd–Frank Act, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER/ LIFE & HEALTH FIN. SERV., Vol. 114 Issue 16, 12 (Aug. 23, 2010)
249 Carney Simpson, Do End-Users Get the Best of Both Worlds? – Title VII of Dodd
Frank and the End-User Exception, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1759, 1787 (2012).
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hedging decision-making process reflected in many of its documents to be able to provide sufficient evidence and convince the regulators or the court that the real purpose of using derivatives was
actually hedging.
3.2.4.3.2. Trade Execution
Requirements of trade execution in the US and the EU share core
aspects. Trading on special platforms is required depending on
whether there is a clearing obligation or not. Provided that the regulators will make only highly standardized derivatives subject to
such obligation, trade requirements perfectly fit the overall intention
of the derivatives regulation. Moreover, the existence of trading
platforms additionally reduces transaction costs, as counterparties
do not have to pay large fees to banks (which they would if they
were negotiating the derivatives privately).250
It is also interesting to note the relationship between the mentioned platforms and exchanges. It may seem that the drafters of the
legislation in the US (and EU as well) assumed most derivatives
would be traded on exchanges. However, the special trading platforms have become the norm. The reasons for this could be the following. First, the legislators did not want to make the transfer of
OTC derivatives from the “dark side” to transparency in too much
of a coercive fashion, i.e., they established special platforms to make
it smoother. Second, in my opinion the regulators still assume complete derivatives standardization in the future and, thus, consider
such platforms as an interim stage before all derivatives move to exchanges. However, as explained further, it seems unlikely for individually tailored derivatives to disappear.
3.2.4.3.3. Reporting
In general, reporting requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act
and the EMIR are rather similar. However, there is a minor difference that relates to the variations in treatment and obligations towards trade repositories. While the Dodd-Frank Act mandates reporting only for bilaterally cleared transactions (as the rest of the
information is compiled and reported by CCPs), the EMIR requires

250

Skeel, supra note 236, at 69.
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reporting by market participants of all open OTC derivative contracts. Nevertheless, both regulations are aimed at price transparency and thus have a great positive effect—namely, they eliminate
the information asymmetry that existed in the past and therefore reduce information costs to market participants, in particular the endusers. Lastly, the reporting requirement serves as a great alternative
means of making the uncleared transactions more transparent.
3.2.5. Extraterritorial Application
Because of the global nature of the derivatives market, regulations have some degree of extraterritorial reach to ensure that market actors do not use jurisdictional limitations to circumvent the intent of the regulations.
3.2.5.1. United States
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions concerning extraterritorial application of the legislation. First, it authorizes the
CFTC and the SEC, with certain exceptions, to prohibit an entity
domiciled in a foreign country from participating in the US in any
swap or security-based swap activities if the regulation of swaps or
security-based swaps markets in a foreign country undermines the
stability of the US financial system.251 Moreover, it provides the
CFTC with jurisdiction over activities outside of the US which either
(1) have a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the US,” or (2) contravene rules or regulations
by the CFTC that are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion
of its provisions.252 The SEC has a similar authority regarding the
security-based swaps, where it is “necessary or appropriate to prevent . . . evasion.”253
Under the authority granted to it by the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFTC issued the CFTC Cross-Border Guidance,254 which contains
the proposed regulations for derivative transactions with non-US
persons. The Guidance permits “substitute compliance” if the entity
251 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §715 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8304).
252 Id. §722 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
253 Id. §772 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd).
254 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41, 214 (July 12, 2012).
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complies with the requirements in its home country and the CFTC
deems those requirements to be adequate—that is, comparable with
the US rules and comprehensive.255 The CFTC has changed its proposal several times before issuing the final version,256 which is still
not a final rule but only interpretive “guidance.” The SEC has also
proposed rules for determining the extraterritorial application of
rules governing security-based swaps.257
3.2.5.2. EU
The EMIR also contains several rules regarding extraterritorial
application of its provisions. First, the clearing and risk-mitigation
requirements apply to transactions between two entities established
in one or more third countries that would be subject to the clearing
obligation if they were established in the EU, provided that the contract has a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU or
where such obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent the
evasion of any provisions of the EMIR.258
The ESMA must develop draft regulatory and technical standards that specify which types of contracts are considered to have a
direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU or in which
cases extraterritorial application is necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of the EMIR.259 Under the current

255 Generally, the Guidance considers 4 categories of persons: (1) US Persons;
(2) Non-US Persons; (3) Non-US Persons guaranteed by US Persons; (4) Non-US
Persons that are “conduit affiliates” of US Persons. Certain considerations apply to
bank branches and to non-US persons with agents or employees who act from
within the United States. Regulatory requirements are categorized as “Entity-Level
Requirements” and “Transaction-Level Requirements” for purposes of determining application and whether “substituted compliance” may be available.
256 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with
Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45, 292 (July 26, 2013).
257 Exchange Act Release No. 34-69490 (“Cross-Border Security-Based Swap
Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating
to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants”), 78 Fed. Reg. 100, 968, 976 (May 23, 2013).
258 See EMIR, supra note 136, art. 4(1)(a)(v); see also EMIR, supra note 136, art.
11(12).
259 See EMIR, supra note 136, art. 4(4); see also EMIR, supra note 136, art.
11(14)(e).
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version of its standards,260 the ESMA identifies the following categories of such transactions: (1) where at least one counterparty is a
third country entity benefiting from a guarantee provided by an EU
financial counterparty;261 (2) where the two counterparties enter into
the OTC derivative contract via their branches in the EU;262 (3) where
the primary purpose of the contract is to avoid or abuse application
of the EMIR.263 However, as in the case with the CFTC’s “guidance”,
these are not final rules.
Moreover, transactions between a financial counterparty or a
non-financial counterparty above the clearing threshold and a third
country entity that would be subject to the clearing obligation if it
were established in the EU are also subject to the clearing obligation
under the EMIR.264
Finally, a CCP established in a third country may provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in
the EU only if it is recognized by ESMA.265
3.2.5.3. US vs. EU
The extraterritorial provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
EMIR are substantially similar in that they allow regulatory agencies
to assert jurisdiction if the contract has a domestic effect or if the
contract is an attempt to evade a regulation.

260 ESMA, Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on contracts having a direct,
substantial and foreseeable effect within the Union and non-evasion of provisions
of EMIR (July 17, 2013), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
library/2015/11/2013-892_draft_rts_of_emir.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DKJ-6M4K].
261 See id. at 23 (covering all or part of liability resulting from the OTC derivative contract, to the extent that the guarantee meets certain conditions).
262 See id. at 24 (noting the contracts with a direct, substantial or foreseeable
effect within the EU).
263 See id. at 24 (discussing when a contract is a part of an artificial arrangement
with the primary purpose to defeat the object, spirit or purpose of any provision of
the EMIR. This is determined by the ESMA as the case where it is necessary to
prevent the evasion of the EMIR.)
264 See EMIR, supra note 136, art. 4(1)(a)(iv) (stating that “between a financial
counterparty or a non-financial counterparty meeting the conditions referred to in
Article 10(1)(b) and an entity established in a third country that would be subject to
the clearing obligation if it were established in the Union”).
265 Id. art. 25(1).
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The advantage of both the Dodd-Frank and EMIR extraterritoriality provisions is that the regulatory authorities can have extraordinary jurisdictional reach over any transaction that involves a US
or EU entity. Given the global nature of the OTC derivatives market,
broad extraterritorial jurisdiction may be necessary to ensure that
the participants in the market do not develop approaches to undermine the intent of national regulations. Moreover, as both regulations are aimed at reducing systemic risk, obviously, it is necessary
to regulate not only the national market participants but also their
foreign counterparties,266 taking into account the aforementioned interconnectedness factor. Besides, in the absence of extraterritorial
provisions other countries would be incentivized to provide an unregulated environment to attract the derivatives participants.
However, the disadvantage of the approach is that it is likely to
have a chilling effect, i.e., it will discourage some foreign counterparties from doing business with US or EU entities or to engage in
transactions that could affect US or EU interests. In addition, excessive regulatory eagerness could encourage regulatory arbitrage—
i.e., drive global businesses toward jurisdictions that are clearly beyond the reach of the US and the EU.
Another disadvantage of the extraterritorial provisions in the US
and EU efforts at regulating the OTC derivatives market is the probability of the lack of harmonization in the regulations, even though
the CFTC and the European Commission issued a joint statement
indicating that “[they] will not seek to apply our rules (unreasonably) in the other jurisdiction, but will rely on the application and enforcement of the rules by the other jurisdiction.”267 While the EU
and the US have not yet promulgated their final rules, from the proposals issued by the relevant regulators it is likely that they will contain substantial differences as, for instance, the CFTC’s “guidance”
seems much more detailed and complicated in comparison with the
ESMA’s straightforward and concise approach. As a result, OTC
derivatives counterparties doing business in both jurisdictions may

266 John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come
Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260 (2014).
267 Press Release, CFTC and European Commission, The European Commission and the CTFC reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives (July 11, 2013),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13
[https://perma.cc/M6L7-PJWV].
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have to comply with two sets of regulations, which could substantially increase transaction costs.
Thus, one of the main issues regarding extraterritorial application relates to the harmonization of different national regulations, as
most of derivatives transactions take place across borders. It is particularly important to coordinate the implementation of the OTC derivatives market reforms. Identified problems regulating cross-border transactions include the need to comply with various regulatory
regimes and the lack of proper coordination in the application of
regulation. In some jurisdictions the same type of requirements apply differently, which increases uncertainty for market participants.
To solve the cross-border issues related to overlapping cross-border
regulatory regimes and regulatory arbitrage, the OTC Derivatives
Regulators Group (ODRG) was created by G20 leaders in 2011.
However, it has not reached significant progress yet.
3.2.6. Closing Word on US and EU
After analyzing the European and American regulations on OTC
derivatives, it is reasonable to conclude that both countries have
taken significant actions towards increasing the transparency and
mitigating the risk of operations in the OTC market. However, the
US legislation seems a little more concrete, meaning detailed, or
even constructive. This may be explained by first, that the American
market suffered much more severely during the crisis of 2008 from
the OTC transactions, and, second, that the legislative process in the
EU is interfaced to the big bureaucratic procedures connected with
interstate coordination. On the other hand, the European approach
is less fragmented and therefore more comprehensive, which is partially due to the absence of any previous OTC derivatives regulation.
Despite differences in approaches to regulation in the US and
Europe, the general principles of the derivatives market infrastructure development and the conclusion of the OTC transactions are
very similar. The main common features determined by the specified acts are the following: (1) centralized clearing of the OTC instruments; (2) orientation towards higher standardization of derivatives; (3) OTC derivatives trade standardized on special electronic
platforms; and (4) increased transparency through extensive reporting requirements. In fact, all four main G20 recommendations were
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adopted in the US and the EU with changes not only in the regulation of OTC derivatives as instruments, but also in their market infrastructure.
Nonetheless, there are still a lot of specific rules to be determined
by the regulators in the near future. Moreover, the regulators have
to identify and resolve cross-border issues associated with implementation of the regulations. Additionally, a certain period of time
is necessary to observe how efficient the regulations are. Hence, it
is still very early to make any definitive conclusions.
3.3. Model Regulatory Framework
The previous sections of this Article gave an overview of derivatives and discussed their role in the financial crisis of 2008, explained the current regulatory regimes in the US and the EU for OTC
derivatives, and, through a comparative analysis of the two regimes,
identified the advantages and disadvantages of each. This section
develops a high-level Model Regulatory Framework for the regulation of OTC derivatives based on the regulatory regimes in the US
and the EU.
A model regulatory framework for OTC derivatives should encompass the basic elements necessary to achieve the core intended
goal of regulation, which is to reduce the various mentioned risks in
the OTC market. It is necessary to ensure that jurisdictions do not
approach the regulation of OTC derivatives in a piecemeal fashion,
which could be counterproductive to the intended goal of regulation. The Model Regulatory Framework can provide guidance concerning the elements that should be incorporated into regulations
for the OTC derivatives market.
3.3.1. Purpose of Regulation
Before designing and discussing each area of the Model Regulatory Framework, it is necessary to outline the purpose of OTC derivatives regulation and make certain assumptions regarding current trends of the OTC market.
The purpose of the OTC derivative regulations should be to develop an OTC market that has a registry and clearing requirements.
Such a market would be a preparatory step to a unified exchange
market for most derivatives including swaps, the creation of which
would eliminate the various risks connected with the unregulated
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derivatives market in the past, such as the transparency and counterparty risks and would reduce overall systemic risk.
The derivatives market can have many different structures and
would be characterized by the presence or absence of central clearing and trading requirements. The simplest structure is an OTC
market, in which the counterparties deal directly with each other
through bilateral negotiations. In this type of market, the trades
generally take place between large, well-capitalized firms that desire
to maximize flexibility in their ability to craft a customized derivative contract to meet their specific needs. The parties to the agreement set the collateral and margin requirements. Lacking a registry
and clearing requirements, this market, however, has a high level of
counterparty risk and is very opaque to regulators unable to identify
abuses or fraudulent practices.
In the OTC clearinghouse market, transactions are made
through a central counterparty and mostly with standardized contracts. There is little counterparty risk, with continuous and consistent mark-to-market valuation of positions and collateral. There
is, obviously, more transparency in a CCP market with daily settlement prices available to the public. Regulators can much more easily and consistently monitor transactions in the CCP market and can
set some criteria for the operation of the CCP. Subsequently, the
exchange market, where most of the derivatives are traded after being cleared, also offers the greatest amount of counterparty protection and can accommodate the needs of retail traders.
The underlying assumption in developing a model for regulation is that the global financial market for derivatives is trending toward an exchange market in which derivative contracts are standardized, pricing is conducted constantly, and there is sufficient
transparency so all market participants are aware of the market conditions, especially pricing. Based on this assumption, some of the
key elements are: standardized derivative instruments, responsibility for regulatory oversight of the market and institutions such as
CCPs, and explicit provisions for central banks to provide emergency liquidity for key market participants in the event of a severe
market downturn or collapse. The development of a CCP system is
significant because there is also a necessity in an exchange market to
reduce counterparty risk. The Model Framework for derivative regulation should also assume that global trading in derivatives may
require a harmonized framework in major jurisdictions such as the
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US and the EU to ensure that even large well-established firms are
required to use CCPs to minimize risk of default. As a result, developing a CCP market for derivatives is a preliminary step for moving
the derivative markets towards an exchange market.
At the same time, the Model Framework should accept the
premise that not all derivatives should be subject to standardization
because counterparties want to tailor the terms of their derivatives
contract to their specific needs. The terms of many derivatives and
particularly the terms of swaps have to be determined by the parties
to ensure that it meets their specific purposes. The Model Framework should acknowledge the need for certain market participants
to use customized derivative instruments should there be a legitimate business reason for not using a standardized instrument.
Thus, the Model Framework should offer the highly customized derivatives some kind of alternative to clearing and exchange trading.
3.3.2. Single Regulatory Authority
The grant of oversight authority to a single regulatory agency
would lead to greater efficiency in oversight and in the administration of regulations concerning OTC derivatives markets for many
reasons.
First, the logic that lies behind having a single regulatory agency
is that uniformity and consistency are necessary in the regulation of
instruments that have the same economic function. Additionally, it
reduces transaction costs for the regulated entities because they
have to meet the requirements established by only one regulatory
agency. In addition, there is less likelihood that the regulated participants will have to suffer from the uncertainty of conflicting regulations, confusion and a fragmented regulatory framework when
only one agency is responsible for regulating activity related to OTC
derivatives markets. Finally, another rationale for granting authority to a single agency is to prevent the development of interagency
rivalry and further emphasize the boundaries between agencies that
could impede effective regulation of the derivatives market.268
Thus, the regulatory approach should be intended to reduce any
ambiguity and confusion that can arise from the attempt by multiple
agencies to regulate the same market.
268 Michael W. Taylor, The Road from “Twin Peaks”— And the Way Back, 16
CONN. INS. L. J. 61, 74 (2009).
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However, it shall be noted that, apart from a single and central
regulatory agency, certain other governmental authorities, in particular the central bank, need to be empowered to monitor the derivatives market and provide their opinions in the form of consultation,
as is currently the case to some degree in the US and more explicitly
in the EU. This is important as the derivatives market involves huge
financial institutions, and various banking instruments serve as underliers of the derivatives themselves.
A potential disadvantage of using a single regulatory agency is
the possibility of regulatory capture by the entities that the agency
is intended to regulate. That is, there is the risk that the single regulatory agency will act in favor of the commercial or special interests
that dominate the industry instead of holding them accountable for
the public interest.269 To protect against regulatory capture, legislation should include provisions ensuring that regulators keep the balance between the interests of the public and the regulated financial
industry. The agency and its officials should be independent of the
political process to reduce the possibility of such a regulatory capture. As fairly noted by Stavros Gadinis,270 there are two major justifications for having an agency of independent bureaucrats:
(1) such experts, being dispassionate, make decisions based solely
on scientific evidence; (2) due to the absence of their interest in winning elections every few years, they set and focus on long-term
goals.
Finally, another aspect regarding the regulatory agency is its
powers to establish and implement rules. Certainly, the agency has
to be authorized to issue such rules as the derivatives market and
the national and global economy change; the regulator is in a much
better position to follow their dynamic and promptly react to any
such changes than parliament or Congress in the case of the US.
Moreover, after the regulation is adopted and becomes effective, certain clarifications may be required upon its enforcement in practice.
Again in this case the regulator seems to be the most competent and
immediate arbiter that is most able to maintain stability in the market, even more so than the courts. However, the extent to which the
269 Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94 (1992).
270 Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101
CAL. L. REV. 327, 339 (2013).
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regulator may effectively provide such clarifications through new
rules may be different and depend on a concrete situation in a specific country as explicitly shown in the example of the US and the
EU. In a single country, the authority of the regulator can be rather
broad, whereas on a multinational level, it seems better to make it
more limited to maintain uniformity, despite the slowing down of
the speed of regulatory actions. Nevertheless, in general, the core
aspects shall be provided by the regulation/statute with the availability of a regulatory agency to further determine them without
making significant changes.
3.3.3. One Definition for All Instruments
To create a harmonized framework for derivatives, a comprehensive definition of derivatives as well as of OTC derivatives is necessary, as opposed to having several different types of derivatives
based on the underliers. As discussed in the previous section of this
Part, the focus shall be on the economic function of the instruments
rather than on the type of their underlying assets. Obviously, this
additionally justifies the existence of a single regulatory authority as
the same type of instrument, e.g., CDS and a single-name CDS,
should be regulated in the same manner.
The definition of derivatives has to be rather broad, on the one
hand, but should also outline certain limits and specify the types of
the regulated instruments. It should not provide an enumerated,
exhaustive list, so as not to create confusion for the market participants. The purpose of broad regulatory provisions concerning covered instruments is to facilitate the possibility of the financial industry developing new types of exotic derivatives in the future.
Therefore, the regulatory agency has to be enabled to determine the
exact scope of the covered derivatives and constantly update it. To
reduce the risk of any confusion and second-guessing, the regulation could also explicitly determine the instruments that are not covered instead of attempting to exclude them by simply not listing
them in the derivatives definition.
Lastly, as to the statutory language, the terms defined in the regulation have to be very close to those used in the market and finance
practices. More precisely, the classic conservative terms “derivative” and “OTC derivative” seem to be the most appropriate ones.
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Thus, an effective regulation should create as much certainty as
possible in terms of the covered instruments for the market participants.
3.3.4. Two-Level Parties Classification
The focus of the regulation should be on covering transactions
with all persons participating in the derivatives market generally,
regardless of the instrument type. In other words, the parties have
to be covered on something other than a “product-by-product” basis. This will ensure both avoidance of any fragmentation issues and
coverage of all derivatives trading participants.
However, a certain division of the covered parties is necessary,
and not just simply on one level. First, such distinction has to be
based on the nature of the parties’ activities, i.e. financial and nonfinancial. Non-financial activities that satisfy threshold requirements should be exempt from mandatory central clearing. The regulation should use the concept of “non-financial party” and clearly
define this concept. The definition should specifically indicate that
it applies only to entities that do not conduct business in the financial industry. Moreover, on the next level, the financial counterparties most actively involved in the derivatives trading—i.e. “rainmakers”—should be classified as dealers or major participants,271
depending on their roles. These parties should be required to register with the regulatory agency tasked with determining the criteria
of such dealers or major participants. The two-level classification of
the derivatives market participants seems to be the most appropriate as it both provides special treatment to big players and creates a
basis for exempting the least significant ones.
Finally, the model regulation should avoid specific provisions
regarding derivatives trading by banks like the Volcker and PushOut Rules. 272 One reason for that is the previously mentioned fair
points of criticism including the fact that excessive market risk via
speculative trades is important to the derivatives market as speculators represent a source of liquidity. Certainly, the attempt of preventing banks from taking such risks could protect taxpayers from
massive bailouts like in 2008 and move risky derivatives trades into
271
272

Using the language of the Dodd-Frank Act to make it clearer.
In its original version before the amendment.
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more diverse framework. 273 However, this seems more like banking
rather than derivatives regulation.
3.3.5. Plain Vanilla Clearing
The key aspects of any regulation regarding the clearing requirement are: (1) instruments subject to clearing; and (2) manner of
CCPs’ operation.
In the Model Regulatory Framework, only “plain vanilla” derivatives—i.e., highly standard ones, have to be subject to the mandatory clearing requirements, as the regulation should be an initial
step towards the smooth standardization of most instruments. This
will also solve the issue of “lost” bilateral netting opportunities in
cases where all instruments are subject to clearing, as now the parties can reduce the counterparty net exposure by clearing their customized instruments bilaterally. Thus, the regulator should be authorized to constantly analyze the market and consider the level of
standardization, trade volume, and other factors when defining derivatives to be cleared. Moreover, the regulatory agency should encourage standardization of the instruments, but not in a coercive
way. It is very important to keep in mind that due to their main
economic function, i.e., hedging, absolute derivatives standardization is infeasible. An example of such non-coercive encouragement
could be relatively lower margin or collateral requirements for the
cleared instruments, which would reduce transaction costs. However, in certain extreme cases, it seems possible to partially apply the
aforementioned method of derivatives treatment suggested by Lynn
Stout, but in a slightly modified way. For instance, derivatives with
a notional amount above a specified threshold that are created solely
for speculation purposes may be deemed unenforceable unless they
are cleared through a CCP and traded on a trade execution facility,
provided that clearing and trading for such contracts are available.
Certainly, such a provision needs careful consideration and has to
be implemented via clear statutory language in order to prevent any
confusion, ambiguity, or unintended consequences. Besides, the
regulation should contain margin and collateral requirements for all
uncleared instruments to reduce the counterparty exposure risks.

273

Krippel, supra note 191, at 286.
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The regulation should also have an explicit and rather detailed
end-user exemption. An effective approach would be to exempt
both commercial enterprises engaged in hedging and non-financial
parties who meet a certain clearing threshold. Put simply, there
should be a relatively broad end-user definition that includes various participants and sets up a clearing threshold for them. In practice, the regulation would allow commercial risk hedging when a
specific size or duration of the derivative contract is not available in
a standardized form on the exchange market. The notional amount
of the contract, however, must be below a threshold amount, above
which the transaction would no longer be exempt. Covering large
hedging contracts makes the size of the OTC derivative market under regulation larger. At the same time, the exception reduces the
possibility that the cost of compliance with the regulation will have
a chilling or discouraging effect on the hedging activities of smaller
businesses. In addition, covering large hedging contracts in the regulation reduces the possibility of using derivatives as a means of
speculation rather than hedging. The regulation should also specify
the hedging requirements. As mentioned earlier, these requirements could be: (1) existence of commercial risk for the company
without using derivatives; (2) dependence on the hedged underlier;
(3) intention of the company’s executives responsible for entering
derivatives.
The justification of having special entities exercising the clearing,
i.e., CCPs, was provided in the previous sections when comparing
the regimes in the US and the EU. However, the regulator should
try to prevent the emergence of multiple clearing houses and should
be authorized to set high requirements for them. Otherwise, this
could lead to a race to the bottom when multiple CCPs compete with
each other in different ways, for instance by lowering their standards.274 Moreover, the existence of numerous CCPs will lead to the
clearance of derivatives between the same parties by different clearinghouses that will, eventually, decrease the efficiency of obligations
netting.275 However, as a countermeasure, interoperability of clearing houses could be authorized, i.e., netting from one CCP to another. This would allow to net obligations all over the market, similar to the case before the regulation, but through a safe CCP system.
274
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The regulation should also require CCPs to set adequate margin and
collateral standards to reduce counterparty risk. Finally, the Model
Regulatory Framework has to address the concern that the regulator
and CCPs are incapable of appropriately managing risks solely on
their own as they do not have the necessary funds and resources to
analyze the complex market in a proper way.276 For instance, there
could be a special committee with major market players that can,
based on the market players’ research, keep the regulatory agency
and/or CCPs informed on the main issues arising in the derivatives
market.
3.3.6. OTC Register
The concept of the register is rather simple and straightforward.
It is a database of all OTC derivatives transactions. This would be a
great support for the regulators to monitor the market conditions,
identify risks and immediately react to the existing issues. Moreover, such a register could be of substantial aid for market participants to adequately assess the situation in the market. More detailed application of such a register is given further.
First, the regulator should establish a public register in order to
identify the classes of OTC derivatives subject to the clearing obligation, the list of authorized CCPs, and the trade repositories and
execution facilities. Second, counterparties and/or CCPs should report the details of any derivative contract (either cleared or not) they
have concluded and further modifications or termination of that
contract to a trade repository, or, in the absence of one, to the regulator. Moreover, the counterparties or CCPs should also report on
the performance status of the transactions, i.e., whether the obligations are fulfilled. This will enable the regulator to identify potential
risky market participants, especially in the case of uncleared transactions. Trade repositories or the regulator will then publish aggregate positions by class of derivatives on the contracts reported to
them.
Thus, the specific details of each transaction, i.e., parties names,
notional amount and term, are not disclosed to public and known
only by the regulator, who can constantly monitor the market conditions and immediately step in as needed. However, CCPs and
276
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trade execution facilities should also be enabled to request such specific information by making a justified inquiry to the regulator.
For example, a CCP or a trade execution facility may really need
details of an uncleared OTC transaction in order to set margin requirements for counterparties who have a poor record of fulfilling
their obligation under uncleared transactions.
3.3.7. Mutual Recognition
Extraterritoriality issues have to be addressed in the regulation.
However, the “substituted compliance” method, which is used
when a domestic regulator examines requirements of foreign regulatory regimes and determines their comparability and equivalence
to the domestic regulation, does not seem to be a very efficient approach, as such determinations are made unilaterally and on a caseby-case basis.
Instead, we suggest choosing one of the following ways of dealing with the cross-border issues, all based on mutual recognition
principle. This principle holds that countries work together and the
whole regime is subject to such recognition. First, the countries
where the majority of the derivatives trade is executed (e.g., the US
and the EU) can together determine, in a form of a published guidance, the requirements for recognizing another regulatory framework as equivalent to theirs.277 This would give other countries that
have yet to adopt relevant laws an idea on how to structure their
regulation in order to join the guidance and would lead to global
harmonization.278 Alternatively, several countries significant in
terms of derivatives trading (or even all G20 countries) may develop
and sign an international treaty setting up the minimum requirements for national derivatives regulation. Additionally, the countries that are members to the treaty or have joined the guidance may
agree on the establishment of multinational clearinghouses and
trade execution facilities for cross-border transactions. The critical
factor in implementing the suggested options is speed—the rules
should be promptly developed before other countries adopt their
own regulations.

277
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3.3.8. Emerging Markets Disclaimer
It shall be noted that the suggested Model Regulatory Framework is most appropriate for countries that have a well-established
and developed derivatives market. To implement this model in
emerging markets, certain adjustments have to be made. First of all,
in terms of implementation timeframe, not all regulatory instruments, i.e., clearing, reporting, and trading, have to be introduced at
once. The legislatures should acknowledge that any regulation
should slightly anticipate but not be far in advance of the economic
relations subject to regulation. In other words, the derivatives market in a specific country should essentially maturate to the point
when it needs to be regulated. Otherwise, heavy regulation of an
emerging market can slow down or even prevent its further development, as implementing various regulatory mechanisms at once in
an underdeveloped market could create significant transaction burdens and costs for the market participants. Thus, the regulation
should be implemented step-by-step after careful analysis of the
market conditions on the need of a particular regulatory instrument.
However, what a legislature in an emerging market can start
with and what should be the first step of implementing the Model
Regulatory Framework is to set up a general legal framework by
adopting rules defining the derivatives. This would create a basis
for the future regulation and serve as a signal for the market participants. Another thing that can be done immediately, even in an
emerging market, is adopting reporting requirements for all OTC
transactions in order to create an OTC derivatives database. This
would, first, enable the regulator to monitor the market regularly
and identify the necessity for its further regulation. Moreover, having data on all OTC transactions helps to analyze the market conditions in order to tailor the new rules, e.g., clearing or trading requirements, to the current market conditions and prevent overregulation.
Depending on the market development dynamics, the legislature could either implement the remaining parts of the Model Regulatory Framework as a next phase of regulation or take the following intermediary step. If the market develops not as rapidly as the
European and American markets did, it is worth adopting rules dividing market participants, but only on a single level as opposed to
the two-level structure suggested by the model framework. In other
words, the market participants have to be split up between financial
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and non-financial counterparties. Furthermore, as part of the intermediary phase, clearing and trading requirements could be imposed
on financial parties in a so-called test run mode, i.e., clearing would
be voluntary, so that the regulator can identify the most appropriate
clearing and trading requirements. Once the OTC market becomes
developed enough, the model framework may be implemented in
full, but again with certain adjustment due to the concrete market
specifics.
4. CONCLUSION
Over the past several decades, derivatives have become a major
factor in global financial markets. Investors use derivatives to hedge
against changes in the value of the underlying asset or to speculate
on movements in its price. The importance of the derivatives for
these functions has significantly increased as global financial markets move towards greater integration. At the same time, the increased interest in derivatives has led to the development of new
types of instruments and practices such as CDSs, which market participants use as a means of transferring some of the risk of default of
the underlying instrument. Moreover, as almost completely unregulated instruments, OTC derivatives have certain inherent risks.
The rapid growth of the derivative markets as well as the prominent role that derivatives played in the financial crisis of 2008 have
created pressure on governments to give regulators greater power
to supervise and control the OTC derivative market. For exactly this
reason, a lot of attention in recent years in the US and the EU was
paid to the regulation of the financial markets. Ambitious regulations adopted by the EU and the US have not yet yielded expected
results. The Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the EMIR in the EU are
the first substantial step to regulating the OTC derivatives market.
Prior to the enactment of the legislation, there were significant gaps
in the ability of the regulatory agencies in the jurisdictions to monitor, oversee and effectively regulate the operation of the non-standardized OTC derivatives market. The legislation has increased
transparency in the market by requiring the use of data trade repositories. It also, at least theoretically, has reduced systemic risk by
establishing the authority to regulate CCPs and the counterparty
risk through the adoption of clearing and trading requirements.
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Despite the similarities between the Dodd-Frank Act and the
EMIR, there remain many points of distinction that set up separate
regulatory regimes of the OTC derivatives market. Many of the differences are due to the variation in the historical development of financial regulation in both jurisdictions. In addition, there is still uncertainty whether the regulatory frameworks adopted by the US and
the EU will be effective in solving the issues caused by derivatives
in the marketplace and for reducing some of the inherent risks of
using derivatives. It is also not clear whether the differences in regulatory requirements will create additional burdens on the operation of the OTC derivatives markets. Apparently, we have to wait
until the regulation in both jurisdictions is fully implemented and
established with all additional rules and technical standards in order
to see how efficiently it operates in practice.
Relying on the suggested Model Regulatory Framework can be
useful for harmonizing the various regulatory approaches used in
different jurisdictions such as the US and the EU. The Model Framework can adopt the strengths of the various approaches in regulating the OTC derivative market while eliminating many of the drawbacks. The Model Regulatory Framework can also serve as a guide
for developing a regulatory approach to the OTC derivatives market
in jurisdictions that have not yet adopted their own regulations.
However, it shall be implemented with certain adjustments in
emerging markets. Over the long run, the use of the Model Regulatory Framework can serve as a support tool for coordinating and
implementing a global regulatory regime that will reduce risk in the
OTC derivatives market and move most of the derivatives industry
towards greater reliance, transparency and safety on a standardized
exchange market.
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